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STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Damira Kamchibekova*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the era of globalization and the war against terrorism, states'
conduct increasingly affects individuals across borders. Such extraterritorial
conduct raises many controversial political and legal questions, including
whether the conduct is in conformity with fundamental human rights standards and to what extent states can be held responsible for it.
Some human rights treaties contain no territorial restrictions.1 Other
treaties, such as the key treaties in the field of civil and political rights are
more limited. For instance, Article 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) provides that the Contracting Parties "shall secure
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" embodied in
the first section of the Convention. 2 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) imposes human rights obligations on a State
Party, when individuals are "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." 3 From this wording it seems that obligations in the area of human
rights apply to individuals subject to their jurisdiction in their own territory.
But does this wording prevent the relevant treaty bodies from applying
these human rights instruments to the violations committed by state agents
on a foreign soil?
It should be noted that the issue is not merely technical. First, at the
methodological level it challenges the traditional notions of jurisdiction, ter* LL.B. 2004, University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Uzbekistan);
M.Jur. 2005, Oxford University; LL.M. 2006, George Washington University. I
would like to thank Professor Dinah L. Shelton for her feedback and supervision of
this work.
1 E.g. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. See also, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosn-Herz. v. Yugo.) 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11).
2
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. See also
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR] (for similar
jurisdictional provisions).
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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ritory and state responsibility, requiring them to be redefined in order to
meet the realities of human rights law. Second, in practice, the question of
extraterritorial responsibility raises some politically sensitive issues related
to the global war against terror and increased military intervention abroad.
In addition, as the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights shows, the question raised in this paper goes to the very heart of the
concept of human rights and reasons for the creation of human rights
treaties.
While the issue of extraterritoriality and human rights has been vigorously addressed for the last decade, there is still a need for a coherent and
rational principle regulating the relationships between a state, its agent and
an individual. This work is aimed at analyzing the scope and the precise
circumstances of states' responsibility for human rights violations committed outside of their own territory, taking as the main example the jurisprudence under the ECHR. As it was succinctly stated, the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights is an "excellent laboratory" to test
whether international law has evolved from its traditional adherence to a
4
territorial concept of states' jurisdiction.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part II gives some background
information on the relevant principles of international law and sets a methodological and conceptual framework for the analysis. It explores notions of
"territory" and jurisdiction under general international law and analyzes the
recent developments in international law governing state responsibility, primarily the adoption of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility by the
International Law Commission. The section also examines the meaning of
extraterritorial conduct and the scope of states' obligations when performed
outside of its own territory. It introduces concepts of positive and negative
obligations under human rights treaties, which require states to "promote
and protect" human rights. However, the ability for a state to fulfill those
positive obligations is curtailed when it acts outside of its own territory,
where it cannot adopt full range of legislative, administrative, judicial and
other measures to "secure" human rights. What is the level of protection
under those extraterritorial circumstances?
Since most extraterritorial activities occur during war time, Part Inl
seeks to examine whether there is a clear line between human fights law
and international humanitarian law and raises the question of whether there
I Olivier De Schutter, Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on Human Rights 5, (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Human Rights and Global

Justice No. 9, 2005), available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/wp/DeSchutter%20
Globalization%20and%20Jurisdiction.pdf.
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exists a gap in protection between the two: if not in terms of rights then, in
terms of mechanisms for their enforcement.
Part IV, Section A consists of a closer analysis of the ECHR case
law on the extraterritorial responsibility and in particular, the highly controversial ruling in Bankovic v. Belgium. 5 Section B analyzes the jurisprudence
of other international human rights tribunals, such as Inter-American Court
of Human Rights and UN Committee on Human Rights. Section C addresses the implications that follow from the Bankovic case at the domestic
level of Contracting States, as in a case presented before the English Court
concerning the civilians' deaths in Iraq6
Finally, Part V gives concluding remarks on what the applicable
test is in cases involving extraterritorial state conduct. It summarizes the
exact circumstances of extraterritorial state responsibility and argues that
restrictive policy considerations implicit in the jurisprudence of human
rights tribunals are inconsistent with universal nature of human rights.
II.

METHODOLOGY AND BASIC CONCEPTS

A. Meaning of "Territory" and "Jurisdiction" in General International
Law
Under international law one of the basic criteria for an entity to
become a sovereign state is territory. Indeed, as stated in the North Atlantic
Coast Fisheries case "one of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it
is to be exercised within territorial limits, and that, failing proof to the con'7
trary, the territory is co-terminous with the Sovereignty."
"State territory is that defined portion of the globe which is subjected to the sovereignty of a state." 8 "The territory of a state consists of
the. . . land, including its subsoil, within its boundaries. To this must be
added... certain waters which are within [national waters] or adjacent to its
land boundaries [territorial sea]... A further part of a state's territory is its
territorial airspace, which consists of the airspace above its land, its national
waters and its territorial sea." 9 International law rules protecting sovereignty of states apply to the airspace as they do to the land below. As the
Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
The Queen (on the application of Al Skeini and Others) v'.The Sec'y of State for
Defence, [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), [2005] 2 W.L.R. 1401.
7 N. Atl. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 167, 180
(Perm.Ct.Arb., 1910).
8 1 Oppenheim's International Law parts 2-4 at 563 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir
Arthur Watts eds., Longman Group UK Limited 9th ed. 1992) (1905).
9 Id. at 572-73.
5
6

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 13

90

International Court noted in the Nicaragua case, "[t]he principle of respect
for territorial sovereignty is also directly infringed by the unauthorized over
flight of a State's territory by aircraft belonging to or under the control of
the government of another State."' 0 This territorial sovereignty of states
over the airspace extends up to the outer space." Although it is hard to
establish the exact boundaries between the airspace and the outer space, it
has been agreed that the limit should be placed at least "as high as any
12
aircraft can fly."
Another fundamental concept in international law is state jurisdiction. Jurisdiction concerns the power of the state to regulate conduct or
consequences of events and is based upon principles of state sovereignty
and equality. 13 It can be expressed through legislative, judicial or executive

actions. 14
Legislative jurisdiction refers to the ability of the state to make its
laws applicable to persons and things within its territory and in certain circumstances may extend abroad. 15 Executive jurisdiction relates to the capacity of the state to enforce its laws. 16 Except circumstances of express
consent by the host state, jurisdiction to enforce is generally restricted to the
state's territory. 17 For example, it is contrary to international law for state
agents to apprehend persons or property abroad. 18
Judicial jurisdiction concerns the power of the state to subject persons or things to the process of its courts and administrative tribunals. Such
power is based upon a number of different grounds. 19 They were developed
10 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 128
(June 27).
11 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 464 (5th ed. 2003), citing Co.Litt. 4
and W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Oxford, 1775, vol. II, chapter 2, p. 18.
12 Id. citing UKMIL, 70 BYIL, 1999 p. 520-521.
1" Id. at 572; Oppenheim's International Law, supra note 8, vol. 1 part 1. 456.
14

Id.

supra note 12, at 576. On the extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction see
e.g., R. Jennings, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand the United States Antitrust Laws,
33 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 146 (1957).
16 Id. at 577.
15

SHAW,

17

Id.

18 Id. referring to the seizure of the Nazi criminal Eichmann by Israeli agents in
Argentina in 1960. See alsoAttorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 5 (1961) District Court of Jerusalem; See also, S.C. Res 138, U.N.
Doc. S//RES/4349 (June 23, 1960); and Security Council Acts on Argentina's Cornplaint Against Israel, 7 U.N. REVIEW No. 2, 14, 15 (Aug. 1960).
19 SHAW,

supra note 12, at 578.
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in 1935 under the auspices of the Harvard Law School in an effort to codify
20
principles of jurisdiction under international law.
1) Territorialjurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is
committed. The principle has received universal recognition, and "is but a
single application of the essential territoriality of the sovereignty, the sum
of legal competences, which a state has."' 21 However, the territorial principle
cannot always be applied in a straightforward manner, particularly in the
situations when the defendant is outside of the state's territory but has basic
level of contact with the forum state, or when attributing specific location to
certain conduct or events may be difficult. 22 To meet these kinds of situations international law distinguishes between subjective and objective territorial principles. 23 "The subjective application of the principle allows
jurisdiction over offences begun within the state but not completed there;
objective territorial jurisdiction allows jurisdiction over offences having
their culmination within the state even if not begun there. '24 The objective
territorial jurisdiction is sometimes called the "effects doctrine", i.e. a state
may regulate activity occurring outside the state if that activity has or is

intended to have effects within

it.25

2) National jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the
26
offender.
3) Passive personal jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the
27
victim.
4) Protective principle. This principle allows states to exercise its
jurisdiction over aliens with respect to any crime cormnitted outside their
territory, which is against state's vital interests, such as security, territorial
integrity or political independence.28 The principle is justifiable given that
20

See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to

Crime, 29
21
22

23
24

AM.J.INT'L.SuP.

435, 445 (1935).

299 (6th ed. 2003).
Oppenheim's International Law, supra note 8, vol. 1, part 1. p. 458.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Id. at 459-460.
Id. (citing S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J.,

(SER.

A), No. 10 as the

leading example of the objective principle.).
25
Id.
26 See Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (April 6) (on
the issue of how the nationality of an individual is to be determined).
27 The passive personality principle is rather a dubious ground upon which to base
claims to jurisdiction under international law and has been strenuously opposed by
the US and the UK, although a number of states apply it. See SHAW, supra note 13,
at 589.
'8 SHAW, supra note 13, at 591-92.
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"the alien might not be committing an offence under the law of the country
where he is residing, but extradition might be refused if it encompasses
29
political offences.'
5) Universalityprinciple. Under this principle, each and every state
has jurisdiction to try particular offences, which are particularly heinous
and harmful to humanity.
Thus, although among those principles the territorial principle remains the common basis for exercising jurisdiction it has been refined and
is developing in the light of two principles:
First, that the territorial theory. . . fails to provide readymade solutions for some modem jurisdictional conflicts.
Secondly, that a principle of substantial and genuine connection between the subject-matter of jurisdiction, and the
territorial base and reasonable interests of the jurisdiction
sought to be exercised, should be observed ..30 [T]he sufficiency of grounds for jurisdiction is an issue normally considered relative to the rights of other states and not as a
3 1
question of basic competence.
B.

Meaning of ExtraterritorialHuman Rights Violations

1.

Scope and Types of Extraterritorial Conduct

It is important to clarify what exactly we understand as an extraterritorial act and what is the scope of states' extraterritorial obligations. From
the ordinary meaning, it is logical to assume that extraterritorial violations
of international human right treaties arise out of a state's activity either
conducted or directed outside of its own territory. What is problematic here
is that many try to put the label of extraterritoriality to everything and include acts that are not genuinely extraterritorial. This section will try to
narrow down the concept of "extraterritoriality" through a categorization of
extraterritorial conduct and distinguish related but separate issues. The
other practical purpose of the categorization is to give an example of real
9 Id. at

591-92.

supra note 21, at 297-98. See also fn 2 at 297, where Brownlie
compares the doctrine stated in the Nottebohm case, in the matter of conferment of
nationality; Kingdom of Greece v. Julius Bar and Co., ILR 23 (1956), 195; and the
statements in the Guardianship case, ICJ reports (1958), 109 (Judge Moreno
Quintana), 135-6 (Judge Winiarski), 145 (Judge Cordova), and 155 (Judge ad hoc
Offerhaus)
31 BROWNLIE, supra note 21, at 297-98.
30

BROWNLIE,
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world situations in which the state acts outside of its borders and the possible consequences of such activity.
Certain cases, although having an extraterritorial element, do not
involve the extraterritorial conduct of the state abroad and, more importantly, do not involve questions concerning "jurisdiction" under article 1.32
They do not fall under extra-territorial jurisdiction, and may be said to be
the application of the objective territorial principle.
Firstly, these are Soering-type cases concerning extradition or expulsion to third countries, where there is a real risk (a necessary and foreseeable consequence) that extradited individuals would face treatment
contrary to state obligations under particular treaty. 33 It has been argued that
in these cases decisions concerning extradition or expulsion to third countries are not the actual exercises of a state's competence or jurisdiction
abroad, because the person is present in the territory of the respondent state
and the state parties obligations are grounded in the measures taken within
their territory and therefore do not fall within extra-territorial conduct. 34 Indeed, the extraterritorial element here is only in the effect of those
measures.35
Secondly, various forms of international "judicial co-operation,
such as the granting of exequatur to foreign judgments" are not extraterritorial acts either since the element of actual exercise of authority abroad is

ECHR, supra note 2, at art. 1.
33 Soering v.United Kingdom, 11 Eur.Ct.H.R. 439 (1989); Michael O'Boyle, The
32

European Convention on Human Rights and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: A Comments on 'Life After Bankovic' in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN

125, 126 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
Rick Lawson, Life after Bankovic: on the ExtraterritorialApplication of the

RIGHTS TREATIES
34

European Convention on Human Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 83, 84 & 87 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga
eds., 2004); Dominic McGoldrick, ExtraterritorialApplication of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF

41, 52 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds.,

2004); Michael O'Boyle, The European Convention on Human Rights and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:A Comments on 'Life After Bankovic' at 126 in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 41, 52 (Fons Coomans &

Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
35 McGoldrick, supra note 34, at 52, See also Nuala Mole, Issa v. Turkey: Delineating the Extra Territorial Effect of the European Convention on Human

Rights,

EUR.

HUM.

RTS.

L. REV. 86, 87 (2005).
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absent.3 6 Examples include cases such as Drozd and Janosek 7 and Pel38
legrini v. Italy.

Similarly, cases concerning state immunity in respect of matters occurring beyond national boundaries39 and various forms of intergovernmental co-operation in the context of the European Union 40 are also excluded
from "genuinely extraterritorial acts." The above listed cases are not problematic either. It is now a well-established position of international human
rights tribunals that a state may be held responsible for its acts, which have
extraterritorial effect. For example, the European Court in Drozd and Janosek said the responsibility of the High Contracting parties "can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside of their
'4
own territory." '
Thus, for the purposes of this paper, an extraterritorial state conduct
concerns acts or omissions performed outside of that state's territory and
not just having effects there. As to the types of extraterritorial state conduct,
it has been suggested to categorize them based on the object at which such
conduct is aimed. 42 Such categorization is very helpful because it reveals
the very purpose of a state's activity abroad. R. Wilde marked out two types
of state's extraterritorial activities: activities aimed at a personalized object
and a spatial object.43 However, in many instances it is hard to distinguish
the particular type, because a state's conduct can affect one object when
control is exercised over the other. 4
36
37

supra note 34, at 84.
Drozd & Janosek v. France & Spain, App. No. 12747/87, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R.
LAWSON,

(ser. A) at 31 (1992).
38 Pelligrini v. Italy, App. No. 30882/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., 8-9 (July 20, 2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.

A1-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97, Eur.Ct.H.R. 8-13 (November 21, 2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int. See also McElhinney v. Ireland, App. no. 30882/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12-13 (February 9, 2000) available at http:I/
www.echr.coe.int; and Fogarty v. United Kingdom, App. no. 37112/97, Eur. Ct.
39

H.R. 10-11 (November 21, 2001) available at http://www.echr.coe.int.

Calabro v. Italy & Germany, App. no. 59895/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (March 21,
2002) available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
4i Drozd, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 91; See also X & Y v. Switzerland,
App. No. 7289/75, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 14, 1977).
40

Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? ExtraterritorialState Action and International Treat), Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 741-42

42

(2005).
43

Id. at 741.

44

Id. at 741-42.
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The first form of extraterritorial conduct is aimed at individuals or
particular groups of individuals, for example activities directed towards
government of the territory, in which the action takes place, or activities
taken to capture members of a terrorist organization. 45 This form of extraterritorial conduct includes diplomatic and consular activities 46 as well as
activities involving some kind of coercive or military action against nonstate actors or governments. Within this group, perhaps the most common
type of violations would be cases of extraterritorial abduction. One of the
first cases involving this type of extraterritorial activity before an international human rights tribunal was a complaint brought by Lopez Burgos
against Uruguay under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 47 Similarly, within the European
context such conduct was the apprehension of the leader of the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) Abdullah Ocalan by Turkey in 1999.48
Extraterritorial conduct "can be also aimed at a spatial object: a
particular territorial unit, for [instance], territorial occupation conducted for
general strategic purposes. '49 This conduct is characterized by plenary or
partial administrative control over other states,50 parts of other states 5' or
non-state territories. 52 It also includes examples when territorial administration is related to the state's asylum policy.5 3 Certain foreign state representatives now operate in the airports of other states, and acting in conjunction
with airport and airline officers attempt to prevent individuals suspected of
intending to make an unfounded asylum claim from traveling to their coun-

45

Id.

The cases arose out of diplomatic and consular activity can be found infra part
IV (A)(4)(b).
47 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm'n No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/
1979 (1981).
48 See Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No 46221/99, Eur. H.R. Rep. 238 (2003).
49 Wilde, supra note 42.
50 E.g., Coalition Provisional Administration (CPA) in Iraq between 2003 and
2004. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); S.C. Res. U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003).
51 See Agreement Between for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for
46

Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. I, U.S.T. 418, cited
in Wilde, supra note 42, at 744 (U.S. base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba).
52 E.g., The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. See Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9).
53 Wilde, supra note 42, at 745.
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try. 54 Such asylum policy-related administrative activities can also be held
in the form of special camps 55 or transit centers, 56 located outside of the
territory of a particular state or states. The recent activity within the general
category of foreign territorial administration is operation of secret detention
facilities to house individuals suspected of being members of terrorist orga57
nizations or somehow connected to these members.
2.

Scope of Extraterritorial Obligations

Within the human rights theory, legal and political philosophers
distinguished between positive and negative rights, which correspond to
positive and negative obligations. According to this view, positive rights
impose upon the state and others an obligation to do certain things, whereas
negative rights oblige to refrain from certain activities. For example Article
2 of the ECHR entails a right to legal protection from deadly force emanating both from state and non-state actors. 58 This right corresponds to both
positive and negative obligations; it prohibits Contracting States from using
their police and security forces to deliberately kill individuals without due
process. It also enjoins them to take reasonable steps to prevent the taking
of life by non-state actors or agents of other states by, among other things,
providing police and security forces. However, positive obligations are not
expressly laid down in the Convention but are deduced from the way the
obligations not to interfere with and to respect the rights and freedoms laid
down in the Convention are formulated. 59 Such approach to the interpretaE.g., U.K. immigration officials at Prague airport; See European Roma Rights
Centre & Ors v Immigration Officer At Prague Airport & Anor [2002] EWHC
54

1989 (Admin) (8 October 2002) available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/

EWHC/Admin2002/1989.html.
55 Wilde, supra note 42, at , Wilde gives an example of Australia with its facilities in the island of Nauru.
56 Within the European Union, States have considered creating "Transit Processing Centers" (TPCs) to which asylum-seekers in EU Member States would be
transferred pending the determination of their asylum claims. See generally Gregor
Noll, Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit
Processing Centers and Protection Zones, 5 Eur. J. Migration & L. 303 (2003).
57 See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations;"Stress and Duress" Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret
Oversees Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al, for a discussion of U.S.

CIA operated detention centers.
ECHR, supra note 2, at art. 2.
Pieter van Dijk, 'Positive Obligations' Implied in the European Convention on
Human Rights: Are the States Still the 'Masters' of the Convention? in THE ROLE
58

59
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tion of Convention rights comes from the principle of effectiveness adopted
by the Court 60 This principle is rooted in "the idea of the Convention as an
effective instrument, and of the Court as an effective piece of machinery. 61
The recent studies expose the artificiality of the classic dichotomy
between positive and negative rights by tracing the positive obligations developed by the case law of the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human
Rights over the past thirty years, especially as these rights are codified in
the European Convention on Human Rights. 62 It has been argued that the
Court interprets the European Convention as creating affirmative actions
that states must implement in order to comply with obligations created by
civil and political rights. 63 Those, in principle, all substantive provisions of
the Convention leave some room for implied positive obligations.6 Another
position advocated by the case-law of the ECHR Court is that the distinction between positive and negative obligations has lost its practical relevance. The Court held that "the boundaries between the State's positive
and negative obligations.. .do not lend themselves to precise definition. The
65
applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar.
It seems, however, that the distinction between negative and positive obligations is still true for the activities conducted outside of state's
national territory, because that state's positive obligations are limited in
scope by the international system that prohibits one state from acting in
another state's territory without that state's permission (except the circumstances of military occupation). In addition, positive obligations are also
66
limited by considerations of fairness and the effectiveness principle itself.
It is certainly not feasible and inefficient if all states try to protect the
OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

17 (M. Castermans-Holleman et. al.

eds., 1998).

On the principle of effectiveness in the Strasbourg system see discussion infra
Chapter IV (A). See also J.G. Merrills, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
60

LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
61
62

Id.
See A.R.

98 (1993).

MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
63
64
65

(2004).

Id.: See also Merrills, supra note 59, at 102.
Pieter van Dijk, supra note 59, at 18.
Keegan v. Ireland, App. No. 196969/90, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 342, para. 49

(1994).
66 Erik Roxstrom, Mark Gibney, Terje Einarsen, The NATO Bombing case
(Bankovic et. al. v. Belgium et. al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights Protection, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55, 71 (2005). See also Dijk, supra note 59, at 22.
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human rights of all human beings everywhere. 67 Arguably, "[t]he only reasonable way to achieve universal coverage of human rights would be for
each state to protect them within its recognized territories (or... territories6 it
effectively occupies) and for each state to respect them everywhere.
However, in practice such a straightforward solution does not work. It is
submitted, that it would be better to adopt context-related approach as to the
scope of state's obligations. 69 R. Lawson finds a confirmation to such an
approach in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, which can also be
applied to extraterritorial situations:
[T]he scope of the positive obligations "must be interpreted
in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly not every
claimed risk to life can therefore entail for the authorities a
Convention requirement to take operational measures to
prevent that risk from materializing." For a positive obligation to arise, "it must be established that the authorities
knew or ought to know at the time of the existence of a real
and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual
(.

..

) from the criminal acts of a third party and that they

failed to take measures within the scope of their powers,
which judged reasonably, might have been expected to
'70
avoid that risk."
Thus, the test of whether state agents are obliged to secure all rights
and freedoms under human rights instrument depends on the consideration
that no 'impossible or disproportionate' burden should be imposed. 71 But to
45 (1990): "A State's obligation to
respect-to refrain from violating-the civil and political rights of individuals (. .)
applies in principle to all individuals wherever they are. Human rights law does not
ordinarily address that obligation expressly, only because the character of the state
system and general principles of international law ordinarily preclude such viola67

See Louis

HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTs

tions. Similarly because a state may not ordinarily exercise authority in the territory
of another state, there is no obligation upon it to act to ensure respect for human
rights there whether by the government of the state or by private persons. A state is

not internationally responsible for another state's failure to respect or to ensure
respect for rights."
68
69

Roxstrom, supra note 66, at 73.
Lawson, supra note 34, at 105.

70 Id. at 106, citing Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, 29 Eur.

Comm'n H.R. 245, para. 116 (1988).
71 Id.
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the extent they assume de facto control over individuals, they should take
"measures within the scope of their powers, which judged reasonably,
72
might have been expected" to avoid violations of these individuals' rights.
C.

State Responsibility and Human Rights

1. Basic Principles of State Responsibility
The major international document on the question of state responsibility is the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts 73 adopted by the United Nations International Law Commission 74 (ILC) in 2001. The ILC articles address the fundamental questions:
when does a state breach an international obligation and what are the legal
consequences? The innovative approach taken by the ILC was that instead
of attempting to define particular "primary" rules of conduct, the articles set
forth more general "secondary" rules of responsibility and remedies for
75
breaches of a primary rule.
The ILC Commission laid down the basic principles of state responsibility in a very "straightforward" manner.7 6 "Every international
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State" 77 and there is such a wrongful act when (a) conduct is attributable to
the State under international law, and (b) that conduct constitutes a breach
of an international obligation of that State. 8
Since states can act physically only through actions and omissions
of human beings, the first element of an international wrongful act, i.e. the
72

Id.

State Responsibility: Titles and texts of the Draft Articles on responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on
73

Second Reading, U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
L.602/Rev/1 (2001). See generally Draft Articles with Commentaries Thereto, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
at 59-365, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
74 The International Law Commission was established by the United Nations in
1947 to promote "the progressive development of international law and its codification." See Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), art.
1(1), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519, at 105 (1947).
15 Rick Lawson, Out of Control. State responsibility and Human Rights: Will the
ILC's Definition of the 'Act of State' Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century? in
THE ROLE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY,

Holleman et. al. 91, 93 (1998).
76 Id. at 94.
77 Draft Articles, supra note 73, at art. 1.
78 Id. at art. 3.

ed. by M. Castermans-
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degree to which states should be held responsible, is an increasingly significant contemporary issue. Articles address the matter through rules of "attribution' (Articles 4-11) that indicate when an act should be considered the
act of a State. 79 That an act of State is a conduct of a State organ, 80 and
conduct of other entities and individuals when such entities or individuals
are directed or controlled by that state,8 specifically empowered to exercise
elements of governmental authority,8 2 or exercise it in the absence or default of the official authorities. 83 In addition, "conduct of an insurrectional
or other movement," which becomes a new government of a state, or "succeeds in establishing a new State [on] a part of [a] territory of a pre-existing
State or in a territory under its administration, shall be considered an act of
84
the new state.
These rules are generally traditional, and reflect a codification
rather than any significant development of the law. However, despite their
apparent straightforwardness the rules involve important ambiguities and
are a potential source of confusion. For instance, what constitutes "governmental authority" for purposes of article 5 and 9? When is an individual or
other entity under "direction or control"? It seems that the answer will require inquiry into underlying "primary" rules of the particular conduct.
Yet, on the general level two main principles behind the rules of
attribution were distinguished. First, without any exception "the acts of
State organs are attributed to that State. ' 86 In this respect state cannot use as
a defence the fact "that an organ is constitutionally independent and that the
central government has no means of compelling it to abide by the State's
8' 7
international obligations.
The second principle is that 'control entails responsibility' .88 "If
armed forces operate abroad, their conduct is attributed to the sending state,
unless the receiving state exercises 'authority, direction and control' over
them." 89 But what about the other side of the coin, the converse situation,
when the authorities do not control events taking place on their own terri-

82

Id. at art. 4-11.
Id. at art. 4.
Id. art. 8.
Id.at art. 5.

83

Id.at art. 9.

84

87

Id.at art. 10.
Lawson, supra note 75, at 97.
Id.
Id.

88

Id.

89

Id.

79
80
81

85
86
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tory? Lawson suggests that "it might be too simple just to reverse the
maxim 'control entails responsibility' into 'no control = no responsibility'.
Such a reversal would allow authorities to [escape] their obligations" and
undermine the effectiveness of the Convention. 90 Therefore, it is suggested
that a state is "bound to secure the rights and freedoms laid down in the
Convention throughout its territory." 91 This presumption has also been
adopted in the case law of the European Court. In the Ilascu and Others v.
Moldova and Russia judgment the Court held that:
Even in the absence of effective control over the Trasdniestrian region, Moldova still has a positive obligation under
Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that... [are] in its power
to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the
92
Convention.
The presumption of responsibility even when national territory is
"escaping" a state's control has been also confirmed in Assanidze v. Georgia judgment in which Georgia was held responsible for the acts of local
authorities of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic. 93
Another important conclusion, which can be derived from the second principle, is that Articles "set no territorial limitation on the attribution
to the State of its organs.1 94 Activities carried on in the territory of another
state will be regarded as acts of the state to which the organ belongs, unless
the organ has been 'lent' to the territorial state. 95
Thus, under Draft Articles, responsibility of a state may arise for
acts of all its organs and other entities or individuals under its 'direction and
control'; and there is no territorial limitation on the attribution.
Id. at 113.
91 Id., see also Schutter, supra note 4, at 23-27.
92 Ilascu v. Moldova [GC], App. No. 48787/99, 2004-VII Eur.Ct.H.R.para. 331,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
93 Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], App. No. 71503/01, Eur.Ct.H.R., available at http:/
/www.echr.coe.int.
94 Lawson, supra note 85, at 96, citing International Law Commission, Yearbook
of the International Law Commission (YBILC), Vol. II, 1975, p.83, para. 1.
95 See Draft Articles, supra note 73, art. 6: "The conduct of an organ placed at the
disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former State
under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the
governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed."
90
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2. Are the Draft Articles on State Responsibility Applicable to Human
Rights Treaties?
One of the methodological issues raised in current debates is
whether the rules on state responsibility as stated in the Draft Articles are
96
applicable in the context of human rights. The ILC itself has "never
wished to exclude human rights treaties from the scope of application" of
its Articles. 97 Conversely, they apply to all treaties unless there is an express
provision to the contrary or there is a lex specialis governing state responsibility under those articles.98 Nevertheless, it has been argued that "the international law on State responsibility ( . .) is not, and should not be,
considered appropriate in the context of the European Convention." 99
For example, it was suggested that Draft Articles are not applicable
to the Convention which "does not primarily operate as an inter-State treaty
as it grants remedies to individuals."' 100 However the argument that the ConLawson, supra note 85, at 98. Lawson's research on this matter shows that most
of writers expressed the view that the general rules of attribution are equally applicable in the field of human rights since these treaties do not provide own solution.
Colin Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of
Terrorism, 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 82, 94 (1983). Others accepted that articles are
fully relevant in the field of human rights even without considering that they might
not. See e.g., Tom Zwart, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS, THE
96

CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HUMAN

pp. 87-90 (1994). On a more abstract level it was suggested
that general rules of public international law find a wider application in 'self-contained regimes' than is often assumed. Bruno Simma, Self-contained regimes, 16
NETH. YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW 133-34 (1985). See also special issue of NETH.
YEARBOOK OF INrr'L LAW, Diversity in secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law, 25 NETH. YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW 1-300 (1994).
97 See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1973] 2 Y.B. Int'l. L.
Comm'n 161, 170, para. 42, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.1 ("[T]he Commission is proposing to codify the rules governing the responsibility of States for
internationally wrongful acts in general, and not only in regard to certain particular
sectors .... The international responsibility of the State is a situation which results
not just from breach of certain specific international obligations, but from the
breach of any international obligation .... ). The ILC also referred to human rights
conventions on several occasions: See e.g., Id. at 183, para.12; Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, [1977] 2 (pt. 2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 9, 20, para. 7, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/SER.A/1977/Add.1 (Part 2), cited in Lawson, supra note 85, at 99.
98 Draft Articles, supra note 73, at art. 55.
99 A. CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 188 (1993) (cited in
Lawson, supra note 85, at 98).
100 Id.
RIGHTS COMMIttEE,
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vention grants remedies to individuals is not an argument for or against the
applicability to the Convention of the general rules of attribution of conduct
to the state for example. 1° 1 Moreover, the fact that the Articles fail to effectively address "mechanisms through which individuals are able to hold
States accountable for human-rights violations"' 10 2 does not mean that individuals lose their ability to invoke responsibility. To its credit the ILC did
not restricted itself to the traditional state-to-state approach as to the nature
of treaty obligations. 103 Article 48 (1) concerns obligations "owed to the
international community as a whole" 10 4 and obligations "owed to a group of
states and established for the protection of [the] collective interest[s] of the
group."' 1 5 The only explicit reference to individuals and non-state entities
occurs in Article 33(2), which provides that part 2 "is without prejudice to
any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may
accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State." 10 6 The commentary to Article 33(2) adds that in such cases, "it may be that some procedure
is available whereby that entity can invoke the responsibility on its own
account and without the intermediation of any State"'1 7, and refers to
human rights treaties and bilateral or regional investment protection agreements. It seems that the ILC overall approach is to leave this matter to lex
specialis rather than to pronounce a general rule. As a result, whether and to
what extent entities other than states may invoke responsibility varies depending on the primary rule involved.
Another interesting argument for non-application of Draft Articles
to the ECHR is that the Convention developed into a "constitutional instrument of European ordre public"'108 To this Lawson notes that whether "this
evolution implies that the ECHR has separated itself from its traditional
international roots" is influenced by what is understood under a constitu101 Lawson, supra note 85, at 100.
102 Margo Kaplan, Using Collective Interests to Ensure Human Rights: an Analysis
of the Articles on States Responsibility, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1902, 1902-03 (2004).
See also Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking States Responsibility in the Twenty-First
Centurv, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 798, 798 (2002).
103 Draft Articles, supra note 73, Article 42.
104 Id. at art. 48 (1)(b).
105 Id. at art. 48 (1)(a).
106 Id. at art. 33(2).
107 Commentaries, supra note 73, art. 33, at para. 4.
108 A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere 188 (1993), (cited in Lawson,
supra note 85, at 98). On the discussion of the Convention as 'ordre public' see
infra Chapter IV (A)(3).
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tional instrument. 109 "But prima facie there is no cogent force in the argument that the general rules of State responsibility cannot apply to a treaty
because it has acquired an important status."11 0

III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN
TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND MILITARY OCCUPATION

A. Relationship Between Human Rights Law and International
HumanitarianLaw
Many decisions of the international human rights courts that address the issue of extraterritorial responsibility for human rights violations
relate to situations where a state has resorted to military force. In light of
this, the assertion of the inapplicability of human rights instruments to extraterritorial conduct apart from the extraterritorial location itself was also
based on the "wartime" context which requires application of international
humanitarian law. I1 In view of this, it is only natural to consider the position under international humanitarian law and address the question whether
existence of an armed conflict precludes application of human rights law.
What is the precise relationship between the protections provided under
human rights instruments and international humanitarian law in cases of
armed conflict? Are the human rights bodies competent to find violations of
international humanitarian law or even evaluate conduct during armed conflicts? What are the mechanisms of protection under both systems?
The classic conception of human rights and humanitarian law under
public international law is that they apply in different situations and to different relationships.' That is, human rights law regulates the relationship
between states and individuals in every aspect of ordinary life, but is largely
inapplicable in times of emergencies that threaten the life, independence or
security of the nation or state. Humanitarian law, meanwhile, historically
109 Lawson, supra note 85, at 101 (citing Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), para. 310 (1995)).
110 Id.

I According to a secret memo prepared for the department of Defense in March
2003 and leaked in June 2004, the applicability of ICCPR to the territory outside
the United States was rejected on two alternative bases: 1) subject matter- ICCPR
"does not apply to operations of the military during international armed conflict;
and 2) territorial- ICCPR does not apply" outside its territory. U.S. Department of
Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogationsin the Global War on
Terrorism: assessment of Legal, Historical,Policy, and Operational Considerations 6 (Mar. 6, 2003), cited in Wilde, supra note 42, at 777.
'-

See e.g., Jean Pictet, HumanitarianLaw and Protection of War Victims 14-15

(1975).
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has governed the wartime relationship of belligerent states and protected
persons, which include enemy persons and neutrals, but not a state's own
nationals. It protects persons and property that are affected by an armed
conflict and regulates permissible means and methods of warfare.
Recent developments and adoption of major human rights documents have somewhat reconciled this classic conception and have created
the real examples of crossover between the fields of application of human
rights and humanitarian law. For instance, Article 15 of the ECHR and Article 27 of the American Convention explicitly state that certain rights must
be protected in any circumstances. They are so-called non-derogable rights.
Among them are the right to life, prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and
the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 containing a list of rights that are to
be protected in all circumstances broadly covers these non-derogable
human rights. The Court in the Nicaraguacase identified common Article 3
as the "minimum yardstick", constituting "fundamental general principles
'
of humanitarian law." 113
Indeed, many studies have concluded that new
norms must be developed, leading to calls for the adoption of the proposed
"Turku Declaration" ' 14 designed to guarantee at least minimum humanitarian standards in "gray zone conflicts" of humanitarian and human rights
laws.115 Another example of overlap between the two bodies of law is the
creation of recent treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 116 its Optional Protocol on the Participation of Children in Armed

113

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 218

(June 27).
114 The Secretary-General, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, para. 2, delivered to the Commission on

Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/80 (Nov. 28, 1995), citing The SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Sub-conmnission on Prevention of Discriminationand Protection of Minorities, Declaration of Minimum HumanitarianStandards, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/80; See also UN Secretary- General, Report on Minimum Hunanitarian Standards, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87 (Jan. 5, 1998)..
115 Asbjcrn Eide et al., Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts Through
Minimum HumanitarianStandards, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 215 (1995); See also Theodor Meron, On the InadequateReach of Humanitarianand Human Rights Law and
the Need for a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT LL. 589, 589-606 (1983).
116 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25 (DEC. 5, 1989).
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Conflict,' 17 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." 8
These instruments include provisions from both human rights and humanitarian law. 119
Accordingly, it is now generally agreed that strict compartmentalization between humanitarian and human rights law is no longer tenable and
that "they now have a shared basis in the fundamental principle of humanity."1' 20 This contention is further supported by the leading opinion expressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the "Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion."' 121 In this opinion the ICJ examined, inter alia, whether
the use of nuclear weapons would violate the inherent right to life as guaranteed under Article 6(1) of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. It has been argued that the
Covenant is irrelevant because it is directed to the protection of human
rights in peacetime. The Court observed that,
.. the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by
operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a
provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of
what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely,
the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to
regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warOptional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 54/263, at 7, U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 49, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/54/49Vol. III (Feb. 12, 2002).
118 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998).
119 E.g., Article 38 (1) of the CRC obliges the State Parties to undertake to respect
and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law that deal with the
protection of children. The Optional Protocol obliges the State Parties to take all
feasible measures to ensure that children under the age of 18 do not take a direct
part in hostilities.
120 Theodor Meron, Human Rights in Time of Peace and in Time of Armed Strife:
Selected Problems, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6
(Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1984).
121 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisorv Opinion, I.C.J.
REPORTS 1996 226.
117

2007

STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS

107

fare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life
contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided
by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not
22
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.
From the abstract two main points can be deduced as to the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law.
First, human rights law continuously applies during an armed conflict. Second, certain human rights must be interpreted in the light of the lex specialis
of humanitarian law.
B.

Complimentarity of Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw

The Court in the Nuclear Weapons opinion accepts the continuing
123
applicability of the Covenant and thus acknowledges the complimentarity
of human rights and humanitarian law. The idea behind the complimentary
or cumulative application of both bodies of law is to provide the greatest
effective protection of human being. In the Coard case of 1999 the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights made the following statement
about international human rights law:
.while international humanitarian law pertains primarily
in times of war and the international law of human rights
applies mostly fully in times of peace, the potential application of one does not necessarily exclude or displace the
other. There is an internal linkage between the law of
human rights and humanitarian law because they share a
"common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common
purpose of protecting human life and dignity," and there
may be a substantial overlap in the application of those
bodies of law. Certain core guarantees apply in all circumstances, including situations of conflict.
Both normative
systems may thus be applicable to the situations under
study. 124
Similarly, in its general Comment No. 31 the UN Human Rights Committee
stated:
22 Id. at para. 25.
Id., See generally Hans-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law in Non-InternationalArmed Conflict: Joint venture or mutual
exclusion? 45 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L L.,162 (2002).
"13

124

Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99,

OEA!Ser.L/V/ll.106, doc.3rev. para 39 (1999).
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[The] Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict
to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more
specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specifically relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of
Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complimentary,
25
not mutually exclusive. 1

One commentator even speaks about the convergence of international humanitarian and human rights law, which means an overlap in terms of the
scope of protection.1 26 It goes beyond mere complimentarity and based on
the "establishment of common values that transcend legalistic arguments
and distinctions."'1 27 The convergence of human rights and humanitarian
law has been demonstrated by the complementary use of both human rights
law and humanitarian law by the political organs of the United Nations,
including the Human Rights Commission, the General Assembly, and the
Security Council, and by the human rights treaty bodies, which have invoked all the relevant guarantees of international law for the protection of
individuals. 128 The practical meaning of the convergence theory can be also
seen from the most recent practice in Iraq in 2003-2004. Security Council
resolution 1483 (2003), which lays down the basic principles for the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, requires all involved to fulfill their obligations under international law, especially those according to the Geneva
Conventions1 29 , and requests the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Iraq to work for the promotion of human rights protection. 130
Human Rights Comm. Gen. Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on State Partiesto the Covenant, I 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR!C/21/
Rev. l/Add. 13/2004/(May 26, 2004).
126Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International HumanitarianLaw, 86 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 789
(2004).
121Id. at 794.
128See also Sec. Council Res., S.C. Res. 237, U.N. Doc. S/RES/237 (June 14,
1967). PreliminaryReport on the Situation of Human Rights in Kuwait uder Iraqi
Occupation by Walter Kalin, Special Rapporteur, Commission on Human Rights,
in accordance with Commission resolution 1991/67, UN Doc. A/46/544 of Oct. 16,
1991; See e.g., also, Security Council Resolution 237 (1967) establishing that Israel
had to observe basic and inalienable human rights even during warfare, cited in
Heintze, supra note 126, at 794.
129 Security Council Resolution, supra note 128, at para. 5.
125

130 Id. at para. 8.
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C. Interpretation of Human Rights Instruments in the Light of the Lex
Specialis of Humanitarian Law
The International Court of Justice concludes in paragraph 25 of its
opinion that the violation of a right to life can only be decided by reference
to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of
the Covenant itself." 13 1 However, the reference to humanitarian law as the
lex specialis cannot mean the displacement of human rights by humanitarian law, at least to the extent of the nonderogable rights. 132 It clearly refers
33
to humanitarian law as a test in interpretation of human rights provisions.1
This view has been confirmed by the case law of human rights judicial and
quasi-judicial treaty bodies. The Advisory Opinion concerning the wall in
the occupied Palestinian territory shows even more clearly that the right to
life in times of armed conflict is only to be interpreted according to international humanitarian law. 3 4 Court in the Coard case have stated that in accordance with the rules of interpretation of Article 31(3) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, they are bound to take into account
"any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relation between
the parties,"' 13 5 including international humanitarian law, and have relied on
the ICJ's pronouncement in the Namibia opinion that "an international instrument must be interpreted and applied within the overall framework of
136
the judicial system in force at the time of interpretation."'
This does not mean that human rights bodies are being asked to
directly apply treaties concerning humanitarian law. The Inter-American
Court explicitly rejected direct use of humanitarian law and ruled that
neither the Commission nor the Court had the mandate to make direct pro137
nouncements on violations of international humanitarian law.
Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 121, para. 25.
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relevance of Paragraph25 of the ICJ's Advisory
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, 98 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 358, 359.
133 Id. at 360.
134 Wall case, supra note 52, at para. 101.
135 Coard, supra note 124, at para. 40.
136 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21).
137 N. Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights law to Armed Conflict, 87
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 860, 737, 742 (Dec. 2005), citing Las
Palmeras v. Colombia, Inter-Am.C.H.R., Case No. 67, Judgment on Preliminary
Objections, 4 February 2000, which rejected the approach taken by the Commission with respect to common Article 3 in Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, InterAm.C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/ser.L/v/II.98, doc. 6 rev. para. 271 (1997).
131

132

110

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 13

The European court has rarely made direct reference to humanitarian law, using humanitarian law principles to interpret specific situations
without referring to them by name. 138 It consistently applied humanitarian
law principles in Turkey cases concerning conflicts raged in the southeastern regions of Turkey between the Turkish security forces and the Workers
140
Party of Kurdistan (PKK). 139 Particularly, in Ergi v. Turkey the Court
interpreted the right to life very broadly so as to include principles provided
141
in article 57 (2)(ii) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
Thus, human rights bodies interpret international humanitarian law
as a guide to their respective treaties. Indeed, in case of the right to life, the
human rights instrument itself makes the renvoi to humanitarian law. In
article 15 (2) of the ECHR, for instance, it is made clear that death as a
result of legal acts of war is not to be regarded "arbitrary" in violation of the
rights to life in Article 2 of the ECHR. "Hence, the lex specialis of the
humanitarian law acts as a test to determine the conformity of state conduct
with the jus in bello as a prelude to determining conformity with the Cove142
nant or the ECHR."'
D. Mechanisms for Implementation and Enforcement

One of the main differences between human rights and humanitarian law are mechanism through which the rights and procedural capacity of
individuals are enforced.143 It seems that individuals' substantive right to
effective remedy is clearly created by all major human rights treaties.' 44 In
contrast there is a little evidence that such right evolved into customary
international law. 141 Since human rights by their nature are "essentially indiId., at 743, citing Ergi v. Turkey, App. No. 23818/94, Eur.Ct. H.R. (July
28,1998).
139 Kilic v. Turkey, App. No. 22492/93, Eur. Ct. H.R., 28 March 2000; Avsar v.
Turkey, (no. 25657/94) Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 10, 2001) available at http://www.
echr.coe.int.
140 Lubell, supra note 138.
141 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977.
142 Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 132, at 361.
138

143 RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW

16

(2002).
11 Id., at 43, giving as example Art. 2(3), ICCPR: Art. 13, ECHR: Art. 25, ACHR;
Art. 7, African Charter on Human and People's Rights: Art. 14, Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Art.6,
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
l45 Id. at 44.
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vidual rights" it would be logical to assume that a right to remedy is extended to individuals directly by effect of international law. 146 In practice,
however, international human rights are incorporated into constitutional or
statutory guarantees of national states and exercised by means of habeas
corpus petitions, injunctions, declaratory judgments, compensation through
7
civil litigation or government programs or other types of remedy.14
"The existence of a general right to remedy under humanitarian law
is much more dubious."' 14 1 Provost finds only one provision conferring a
similar right to remedy as human rights provisions in Article 3 of the 1907
Hague Convention IV. which lays down a principle of customary international law, "that a belligerent state shall pay compensation for violations of
the laws of war and shall be held responsible for all acts of its armed
forces."' 149 However, the subsequent practice in application of this provision
indicates that it can be used for benefit of states only. 150 Similarly The
ICRC Commentary to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention further clarified
that under international humanitarian law "[t]he state is answerable to an15 1
other contracting State and not to the individual."
According to Provost "[t]he lack of international right to a remedy
is echoed by the form of incorporation of humanitarian law into municipal
law," the most common form being field manuals issued to the armed
forces or sometimes adoption of penal provisions allowing to prosecute
52
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and war crimes in general.
Id.
Id. at 45, citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Final Report of the Independent Expert on
the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitationfor Victims of Grave
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, UN Doc.E/CN.4/2000/
62, 'First Report', UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/65; Theo van Boven, 'Final Report of a
Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms', UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, along with his previous reports, UN Docs. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1990/10.-/1991/7 and -/1992/8.
148 PROVOST, supra note 143, at 45.
149 Id.
146
147

150

Id.

151Jean

Pictet ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949- Commentar, on
the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times
of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1958) 77, 211.
'52

PROVOST,

supra note 143, at 48,citing the U.S. War Crimes Act, 18 USC

§ 2401 (1996), the British War Crimes Act 1991 and s. 7 (3.71) of the Canadian
Criminal Code (Rev. Stat. of Can. 1985, c. C-46).
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However, the principle of complimentarity of human rights and humanitarian law also means that the remedies under human rights law can be
invoked during an armed conflict. Most egregious violations of humanitarian law will be coextensive with violations of non-derogable human rights,
for which there is undoubtedly a right to a remedy. Legal literature points
out that human rights protection can be used to compensate for the deficits
of international humanitarian law, among which are "fairly ineffective" implementation mechanisms.' 53
Thus, the concurrent application of human rights and international
humanitarian law in times of armed conflict is not problematic. On the contrary, it enhances protection because of the principle of complimentarity.
The precise content of human rights obligations in situations of armed conflict will, however, be influenced by the relevant rules of international humanitarian law. Human rights must be interpreted in a manner consistent
with international humanitarian law.
IV.

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN

RIGHTS TREATIES

A.

Jurisprudence under the ECHR

1.

Methods of Interpretation

When presenting a petition to an international human rights body a
victim must first of all overcome the jurisdictional hurdle. The petition must
be prima facie admissible ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione
temporis and ratione loci. Article 1 of the European Convention provides
that "[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention."' 15 4 Accordingly, for an individual to be able to rely on the Convention,
he must demonstrate that at the relevant time he was "within the jurisdiction" of the state concerned.
But before taking a closer look at how the Court addressed admissibility issues when an alleged act occurred extraterritorially it is useful to
make a brief overview of the methods of interpretation adopted by Convention's bodies.

153 Heintze, supra note 127, at 798, citing Judith Gardam, The Contribution of the
International Court of Justice to InternationalHumanitaria, Law, 14 LEIDEN J. OF
INT'L L. 353 (2001). Vol. 14, No. 2, 2001, p. 353.
154 ECHR, supra note 2, at art. 1.
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The Court's approach to the interpretation and application of the
155
ECHR is based upon the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It
referred to relevant Articles 31 to 33 as "generally accepted principles of
international law" and was ready to be guided by them even when the Vienna Convention had not yet entered into force. 5 6 As stated in Article 31
(1) of the Vienna Convention, "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." The context is
then defined as including the text "including its preamble and annexes" and
certain other material. 157 Together with the context one should take into
account (a) ". . .any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties."' 58 Finally,
Article 31 (4) provides that "a special meaning shall be given to a term if it
is established that the parties so intended." The Vienna Convention also
identifies supplementary means of treaty interpretation such as preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 15 9 recourse to
which may be held in order to confirm "the meaning resulting from the
application of Article 31" or when the meaning is still "ambiguous or ob16
scure" or "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.'" 0
Apart from generally accepted principles such as textuality principle, interpretation of a treaty as whole, and in accordance to the relevant
rules of international law and the drafters' intent, the Court developed its
own approaches, which are now firmly rooted in its jurisprudence. In particular, the Court expressly endorsed the view that the Convention is a "living
instrument" and "must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions." 161 This approach applies not only to the substantive rights protected
under the Convention, but also to those provisions which govern the opera155 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 UNTS, Vol. 1155, 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
156 Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur.Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 29

(1975).
117VCLT,
158

supra note 155, at art. 31(2).

Id. at art. 31 (3).
at art. 32.

159 Id.
160

Id.

Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 18
(1978).
161
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tion of the Convention's enforcement machinery. 162 Another "important and
creative technique" adopted by the Court is what it terms a "practical and
effective" interpretation. 163 The idea behind this principle is that ". . .the
Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective." 164 The Court applied the
effectiveness principle to a wide range of issues including state responsibility. 165 Examples of the effectiveness principle in the context of state responsibility included cases involving Article 11,166 cases on the responsibility
for lack of renumeration and deficient representation. 167 The famous Soering case was probably the most demonstrative of the Court's view of the
effectiveness principle as the key to the case. Recalling that the object and
purpose of the Convention "require that its provisions be interpreted and
applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective,"' 168 the Court
observed that Article 3 contains an absolute prohibition and enshrines a
fundamental value. Although it is not usual for the Convention institutions
to pronounce on the existence or otherwise potential violations of the Convention, a departure from this rule was necessary in order to ensure the
effectiveness of the safeguard provided in Article 3.
2. Is the Jurisdictional Competence under the ECHR "Primarily
Territorial"?
In Bankovic v. Belgium, a landmark case on the issue of extraterritoriality, the Court restricted the applicability of the Convention to the national territory of the State parties mainly on the basis of the argument that
"from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional compe169
tence of a State is primarily territorial."
This case concerned a claim brought by six citizens of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") against seventeen European countries and
See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) 1, 26
(1995).
163 J.G. Merrills, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
162

98 (Manchester University Press1993) (1988).
i64 Artico v. Italy, App. No. 6694/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 33 (1980).
165 MERRILLS, supra note 163, at 109-13.
166 See Schmidt and Dahlstrom v. Sweden, (no. 5589/72) E. Ct. H.R. (1976);
Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden (no. 5614/72) Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976) Article 11 provides for freedom of assembly and association.
167 Van der Mussele v. Belgium, App. No. 8919/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983);
Goddi v. Italy, App. No. 8966/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984).
168 Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 467; Artico, supra note 164, para.16.
169 Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 59.
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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revolved around a NATO bombing mission of the radio and television station in Belgrade. The mission caused 16 deaths and injured a further 16
persons. The claimants alleged violations of Article 2 (Right to life), Article
10 (Freedom of Expression) and Article 13 (Right to an Effective remedy). 170 The Court held that the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provision of the Convention as the applicants were not
within the jurisdiction of the respondent states within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.17 1 On the question of the meaning of the words in
Article 1, the Court concluded as follows:
As to the 'ordinary meaning' of the relevant term in Article
1 of the Convention, the Court is satisfied that, from the
standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional
competence of a state is primarily territorial. While international law, does not exclude a State's exercise of jurisdiction extraterritorially, the suggested bases of such
jurisdiction (including nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, passive personality and
universality) are, as a general rule, defined and limited by
the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant
States. 172
The Court found a confirmation of this essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction in the state practice regarding derogations under Article 15, in its
case law 173 and in the travaux preparatoires.Interestingly, this was the first
time the Court considered the drafting history in the interpretation of Article
1. The drafting history of Article 1 shows that Article 1's phrase "every one
within their jurisdiction" had originally been drafted as "all persons residing
within their territories." It had been changed, because of a concern that
"'residing" might be too restrictive if interpreted as requiring the legal indiId. at para. 28.
Id. at paras, 35, 75, 82.
172 Id. citing (Mann, "The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law", RdC,
1964, Vol. 1; Mann, "The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Twenty
Years Later", RdC, 1984, Vol. 1; Bernhardt, Encyclopaediaof Public International
Law, Edition 1997, Vol. 3, pp. 55-59 "Jurisdiction of States" and Edition 1995,
Vol. 2, pp. 337-343 "Extra-territorialEffects of Administrative, Judicialand Legislative Acts"; Oppenheim's International Law, 9th Edition 1992 (Jennings and
Watts), Vol. 1, § 137; P.M. Dupuy, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 61 (4th ed.
1998); and BROWNLIE, supra note 17 at pp. 287, 301 and 312-314).
173On the analysis of the relevant state practice and case law see the discussion
infra IV(A)(4).
170

'7'
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cia of the formal concept of residence. The Court cited the following extracts from the Collected Edition of the Travaux Preparatories of the
European Convention on Human Rights:

The assembly draft had extended the benefits of the Convention to "all persons residing within the territories of the
signatory States." It seemed to the Committee that the term
"residing" might be considered too restrictive. It was felt
that there were good grounds for extending the benefits of
the Convention to all persons in the territories of the signatory States, even those who could not be considered as reThe
siding there in the legal sense of the word .
Committee therefore replaced the term "residing" by the
words "within their jurisdiction" which are also contained
in Article 2 of the Draft Covenant of the United Nations
Commission. 174
The next relevant comment prior to the adoption of Article 1, made by the
Belgian representative on 25 August 1950 during the plenary session of the
Consultative Assembly was to the effect:
...henceforth the right of protection by our States, by virtue of a formal clause of the Convention, may be exercised
with full force, and without any differentiation or distinction, in favour of nationals of whatever nationality, who on
the territory of any one of our States, may have had reason
175
to complain that [their] rights have been violated.
The wording did not give rise to any further discussion and the text was
176
adopted on the same day.

In its analysis the Court also examined whether the doctrine of the
Convention as a "living instrument"' 77 ought to affect its conclusion on Article 1, and held that it did not. It reasoned, that the "issue in the present
case is determinative of the very scope of the Contracting Parties' positive
obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the entire Convention
system of human rights' protection as opposed to the question, under discussion in the Loizidou case (preliminaryobjections), of the competence of

174

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX PREPARATORIES

OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
175

RIGHTS,

vol. 111, 260 (1985).

Id.
at vol. VI, p. 132.
See Loizidou, supra note 162, at 23-24, paras. 62-64.

176 Id.
177

ON HUMAN
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the Convention organs to examine a case."' 178 The Court concluded the examination of the meaning of the words "within their jurisdiction" by stating
that "[i]n any event, the extracts from the travaux priparatoiresdetailed
above constitute a clear indication of the intended meaning of Article 1 of
the Convention which cannot be ignored.' ' 79
Having relied on the drafting history, the Court, nevertheless, cautiously notes that it is not "finding the travaux 'decisive'; [but] rather this
preparatory material constitutes clear confirmatory evidence of the ordinary
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention."'' 80
The contention that Article 1 places a territorial limitation on Contracting States' general duty to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in
the Convention has been largely criticized.'8 1 It was submitted that the way
the Court interprets the term 'jurisdiction' was restrictive'8 2 and flawed. 183
As one distinguished scholar noted "[n]arrow territorial interpretation of
human rights treaties is anathema to the basic idea of human rights, which
is to ensure that a state should respect human rights of persons over whom
84
it exercises jurisdiction."1
Firstly, it has been argued that the meaning of the term "jurisdiction" in international law will not necessarily be the same in the interpretation of a human rights treaty. 85 According to Schutter, the Court seems to
178

Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 65.

Id.
Id.
181 See Erik Roxtrom, Mark Gibney, Terje Einarsen, The NATO Bombing case
(Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights protection, 23 B.U. INTL'L L.J. 55; Kerem Altiparmak, Bankovic: An Obstacle to the
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in Iraq? 9 J. Conflict &
Security L. 213 (2004); Tarik Abdel-Monem, How Far Do the Lawless Areas of
Europe Extend? ExtraterritorialApplication of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 159; Schutter, supra note 4.
182 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties
in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J.
179
180

INT'L L. 529 (2003).
183 Altiparmak, supra

note 181.

Theodor Meron, Extraterritorialityof Human Rights Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L.
78, 82.
185 Roxtrom, supra note 181, at 66, See also, Orakhelashvili, supra note 182, at
184

541-542. "In addition, the specific context of human rights norms does not permit
the assimilation of jurisdiction in Article 1 with the jurisdiction of states in general
international law. Presence or absence of the latter jurisdiction is irrelevant for the
legality of acts such as torture or the unlawful deprivation of life. A state may not
justify such actions by reference to the question whether situation falls, territorially
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confuse two entirely different understandings of the concept of jurisdiction:
notion of "prescriptive jurisdiction" under general international law and the
notion of "jurisdiction" as a source of potential State responsibility under
Article 1.186 The analysis of the Convention in the context of general international law when "one can simply take any general treaty on international
law, turn to a section entitled 'state jurisdiction', look to see how the author
18 7
uses the term, and then simply plug that meaning in"' seems to be oversimplified. The Court did not consider the possibility that the term in international law might have a different meaning depending on the context and
purpose of the inquiry. 8
Secondly, territorial understanding of Article 1 is at odds with the
methods of interpretation, employed by the Court throughout its case law
(such as interpretation of context, object and purpose of a treaty), and is
also against the effectiveness principle and the principle of interpretation
"inlight of present day conditions."' 18 9
To illustrate, the object of the Convention is human rights, which
are universal in their nature, while the purpose is protection of those rights
or in the Convention's wording "to taking the "first steps for the collective
enforcement."' 190 The objective nature of a specific human rights treaty relates to the character of substantive obligations in the treaty and not to
or otherwise, within its junsdiction. (... ) [I]t is rather curious to interpret the scope
of 'jurisdiction' in Article 1 as referring to the substantive jurisdiction of a state.
(... ) It is the question of attribution and causation which is relevant here; this has
to be established without any reference to the issues of substantive jurisdiction."
186 Schutter, supra note 4, at 9. On the difference between notion of jurisdiction
under general international law and under Article 1 See also, Orakehelashivilli,
supra note 182, at 539-540 (distinguishing remedial and substantive notions of jurisdiction. According to him, the primary function of 'substantive' jurisdiction, exercised through specific powers of legislation, administration and adjudication is to
allocate competences between states, delimiting the scope of their freedom of action. In contrast the notion of jurisdiction under article 1 of the Convention is not
substantive, but remedial. Article 1 does not purport to determine the substantive
limits to the jurisdiction of contracting states. "Its purpose is to delimit an area
within which the Convention obligations operate, and to limit the freedom of action
of contracting states without, prima facie, laying down any limits in terms of substantive, or territorial jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction under Article 1 is a tool for
identifying whether alleged violations of the Convention may be imputable to one
or another contracting state.").
187 Roxtrom, supra note 181, at 66.
188 Id.; See also, Orakhelashvili, supra note 182, at 541.
189 Altiparmak, supra note 181, at 227.
190 Roxstrom, supra note 66, at 69.
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whether treaty is universal or regional in scope.19' Orakhelashvili further
argues that extraterritorial application and non-reciprocity of obligations
follow from the nature of those obligations. 192 As was observed in Ireland
v. the United Kingdom:
Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements
between Contracting States. It creates, over and above a
network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble benefit from a
.collective enforcement'. 193

Therefore, it "must be presumed" that the obligations of state to respect and
194
to ensure human rights would not end at the borders.
As to interpretation of the Convention in the light of present day
conditions, since the modern wars are carried out with the help of high
technology and overwhelmingly by aerial bombardments, the conduct of
armed forces should have been evaluated in the light of these recent
developments.
Finally, in order to make "safeguards" of the Convention "practical
and effective" one would think that the Court would consider the issue of
the respondents' liability under the Convention independently of the status
of the FRY with respect to that instrument.
3. Convention's Regionalism
Another aspect of the Court's decision in Bankovic, which has been
vigorously criticized, is that the Court decided to limit application of the
ECHR to the territory of its member states.
The applicants had argued before the Court that "any failure to accept that they fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent states would
defeat the ordre public mission of the Convention and leave a regrettable
vacuum in the Convention system of human rights protection."' 19 5 The answer of the Court to this contention was the following:
It is true that, in its above-cited Cyprus v. Turkey judgment.

. .

the Court was conscious of the need to avoid 'a

191Orakhelashvili, supra note 182, at 532.
Id.

192

Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 90, para. 239 (Jan. 18,
1998).
194 Id.at 71.
193

195 Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 79.
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regrettable vacuum in the system of human-rights protecthat comment retion' in northern Cyprus. However .
lated to an entirely different situation to the present: the
inhabitants of northern Cyprus would have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the Convention Safeguards and system which they had previously enjoyed, by
Turkey's 'effective control' of the territory and by the accompanying inability of the Cypriot Government, as a Contracting State, to fulfill the obligations it had undertaken
under the Convention.
The Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating,
subject to Article 56 of the Convention, in an essentially
regional context and notably in the legal space (espace
juriduque) of the Contracting States. The FRY clearly does
not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. Accordingly, the
desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights'
protection has so far been relied on by the Court in favour
of establishing jurisdiction only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would
196
normally be covered by the Convention.

It follows from this abstract that the only type of vacuum in rights protection as a result of an extraterritorial conduct occurs in the territory of another party to the same treaty and prevents the second state from fulfilling
its obligations under that treaty. According to Wilde this, then, would mean
that action taken by one state outside the legal space of the treaty would
97
take place in a 'legal black hole.'
Alternatively, the court's statement that the ECHR operates "essentially in a regional context" does not mean that its application outside Europe is excluded. 98 Several arguments are advanced in support of this
proposition.
The Court's invocation of the "legal space" concept should be best
interpreted as a response to the applicants' argument about a vacuum in
human rights protection rather than a statement of a general principle about
the spatial application of the ECHR. 199
Id. at para. 80.
197 Wilde, supra note 42, at 794.
198 Id. at 795.
196

199 Id.
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Next, "regional context" is not a clear reference to a territorial area;
it could equally refer to a regional grouping of states, irrespective of where
they act. 200 Indeed, "if one starts from the premise that the ECHR is a
human rights treaty, it is natural to assume that the focus of Article 1 is not
the identity of the beneficiaries of the Convention (. .) but the identity of
the states whose acts and inactions the Convention regulates. ' 20 1 What
comes to a phrase "notably in the legal space of the Contracting states" it is
also not a clear territorial restriction because of the word "notably. "202
Finally, such regional limitation is contradicted by the case law of
the Court. 20 3 In the Ocalan case, 20 4 the Court held that actions of Turkish
agents in the international airport of Kenya, not a Convention State, took
place within Turkish jurisdiction. Similarly, the Court declared admissible
the Issa case, 205 related to Turkish actions in Iraq. At the merits stage it
affirmed that had there been a sufficient factual basis, then the alleged violations would come within Turkey's jurisdiction.
To sum up, the wording in Bankovic does not allow making a clear
cut conclusion that the ECHR applies only in a regional context. Moreover,
the case law seems to have overruled Bankovic. Hence, the exact position of
the Court as to responsibility of states for activities outside of the territories
of member states remains to be seen.
4.

Practice in the Application and Interpretation of the ECHR

Article 31 (3)(b) refers to "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation. ' 20 6 Naturally, in the context of the ECHR "subsequent
practice" encompasses both the practice of the states and the practice of the
Convention's organs.
a)

Practice of the Contracting States

Using this method of interpretation the Court noted that that the
lack of derogation by contracting states with regard to their extraterritorial
actions under Article 15 as evidence militating against Convention's extraWilde, supra note 42, at 794.
Roxstrom, supra note 181, at 72.
202 Wilde, supra note 42, at 794-95.
203 Id. at 795.
204 Ocalan, supra note 48. See also, discussion infra 4 (b).
205 Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (March 3, 2005),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int. See also, discussion infra 4 (b).
206 VCLT, supra note 155, at art. 31 (3)(b).
200
201
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territorial applicability. 20 7 It is questionable whether this factor can be regarded as decisive. First, the fact that states choose not to derogate could
simply mean that they did not expect their action in this specific situation to
20 8
result in violation of Convention rights.
Then, it can also be that for purely political reasons states preferred
to avoid the embarrassment of negative public opinion; the public may feel
that it really does intend to violate human rights in the course of its operations when before engaging in armed conflict outside its territory it lodged a
formal declaration under Article 15.209
Finally, it is also argued that generally when the enforcement of a
treaty is entrusted to a judicial supervisory body, such as the European
Court, the value of the attitudes of contracting states is diminished because
the Vienna Convention requires existence not merely of subsequent practice
as such, but of practice which provides evidence of an agreement between
10
the parties.2
b)

Convention Organs' Practice

As it was mentioned earlier, one of Bankovic's shortcomings is that
the Court's analysis of its own case law is both selective and superficial.
Contrary to what the Court claimed in Bankovic, its holding is not consistent with the previous and subsequent jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs. Now we will turn to the practice of the Convention organs in
interpreting the operation of the ECHR to acts committed by a state outside
of its own territory. It will be divided into groups based upon different
forms of authority: authority over personalized objects and spatial objects.
i) Authority Over Persons.-ExtraterritorialActivities of Consulates and
Embassies

The first line of cases to be examined here are illustrations of the
rule that extraterritorial activities of a state through its consulates or embassies abroad may bring the persons affected by them within the jurisdiction
of that state through the fact of control by a state's agent.
X. against Germany211 is the earliest authority on the matter. The
applicant, who had been born in Bohemia, started life as an Austrian citizen, had acquired Czech nationality and, in 1938, German nationality. In
207
208
209
210
211

Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., at para 62.
Roxstrom, supra note 66, at 119.
Orakhelashvili, supra note 182, at 541.
Id.
X. v. Germany [1965] 8 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 158, App. No. 1611/62.
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1945 he had been expelled from Czechoslovakia. He was at the time of
application living in Morocco, in possession of a Spanish refugee passport. 212 He claimed to be a German citizen. His complaint was that German
consular officials in Morocco had asked the Moroccan authorities to expel
214
him. 213 He alleged various breaches of the Convention.
The Commission found that ". . .[i]n certain respects, the nationals
of a Contracting State are within its "jurisdiction" even when domiciled or
resident abroad, whereas in particular, the diplomatic and consular representatives of their country of origin perform certain duties with regard to
them which may, in certain circumstances, make that country liable in re215
spect of the Convention.
Similarly, in X v. United Kingdom,216 a complaint in respect of the
alleged failure by the British consulate in Jordan to assist in recovering
applicant's child from her husband, and almost in the same terms in W.M. v.
Denmark2 17, a case decided in 1992, where the Danish ambassadorhanded
over to GDR police an individual seeking diplomatic asylum at the Danish
Embassy in East Berlin, the Commission observed:
It is clear, in this respect, from the constant jurisprudence
of the Commission that authorized agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular agents, bring other persons or
property within the jurisdiction of that State to the extent
that they exercise authority over such persons or property.
[. ..] Therefore, in the present case the Commission is satisfied that the acts of the Danish ambassador complained of
affected persons within the jurisdiction of the Danish authorities within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention

(. .. ).218

212
213
214
215

Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id., at 168.

X v. United Kingdom, unreported App. No. 7547/76, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. Dec. 15, 1977, available at www.echr.coe.int.
'16

217

W.M. v. Denmark, unreported App. No. 17392/90, Eur. Comm'n. H.R. 14 Oc-

tober 1992.
218

Id.

124

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 13

ii) Authority Over Persons: ExtraterritorialPrisons
To date, the only authority on the status of extraterritorial prisons
addressed by the Court is the case of Hess v. United Kingdom. 2 19 The facts
of the case are the following. From 1947 Rudolf Hess, a former Nazi leader,
was detained in Spandau prison in Berlin. The prison was administered and
guarded jointly by the four allied powers: the Soviet Union, France, the
United Kingdom and the United States.220 In 1973 Frau Hess brought a
complaint against the United Kingdom, which was the only country concerned having accepted the right to individual petition. The complaint al221
leged violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
In its decision the European Commission said that Mr. Hess was
not "within the jurisdiction" of the United Kingdom because of the joint
responsibility of the four powers:
The Commission is of the opinion that the joint authority
cannot be divided into four separate jurisdictions and that
therefore the United Kingdom's participation in the exercise of the joint authority (... ) and supervision of Spandau

Prison is not a matter "within the jurisdiction" of the United
Kingdom, within the meaning of Article 1 of the
222
Convention.
However, having observed that the exercise of the authority concerned
takes place not in the territory of the United Kingdom but outside its territory, in Berlin, the Commission also noted:
"[A] State is under certain circumstances responsible under
the Convention for the actions of its authorities outside its
territory [. .].There is in principle, from a legal point of
view, no reason why the acts of the British authorities in
Berlin should no entail the liability of the United Kingdom
under the Convention.' 3
Ilse Hess v. United Kingdom,18 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 146, App. No. 6231/
73, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1975).
219

220

Id.

ECHR, supra note 2, art. 3 (prohibits "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment") and art. 8 (protects the "right to respect for family and pri221

vate life").
222 Hess, supra note 219, at 176.
223 Id., at 174 (emphasis added), cited X. v. Germany, supra note 211, at 168 as a
previous case-law; See also Veamcombe & Others v. F.R.G. & U.K., 32 Y.B. Eur.
Cony. On H.R. 74, 79 (on p. 79 Acts performed by organs of an occupying State
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It seems that in this case the Commission was comfortable with the extraterritorial location of the prison. It is rather the fact that the United Kingdom did not have a real power to release Hess that was at issue 224 This
interpretation has been confirmed in Drozd and Janousek v. France and

Spain, where the court agreed with that in Hess "France's responsibility
could nevertheless be excluded if France had no real power to guarantee
' 225
observance of the rights set out in the Convention.
iii)Authority over Persons: ExtraterritorialArrest and Detention Cases
of Stocke, Ocalan and Ramirez

Mr Stocke, a German citizen, in order to avoid arrest for tax offences fled to Switzerland and then to Strasbourg in France. A private police informer under a false pretext got him back to Germany. Mr Stocke
filed a complaint, which relied on Article 5(1) of the Convention, alleging
that the circumstances of his arrest made it and his detention both on remand and after conviction, unlawful. He also asserted that those circumstances had deprived him of a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6(1).
Both the Commission and the Court considered that it has not been
established that the cooperation between the German authorities and the
private informer extended to unlawful activities abroad. However, the Commission examined whether, if it had been otherwise, the conduct of German
authorities abroad would have violated the Convention. Following its previous decision in Cyprus v. Turkey 226 it noted:

According to Article 1 of the Convention the High Contracting Parties have to ensure the rights under Article 5 § 1
of the Convention to everyone "within their jurisdiction."
This undertaking is not limited to the national territory of
the High Contracting Party concerned, but extends to all
persons under its actual authority and responsibility,
whether this authority is exercised on its own territory or
abroad. Furthermore (... ) authori[z]ed agents of a State not
only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad, but bring
any other person "within the jurisdiction" of that State to
(including members of its army) are generally attributable to this state and not to
the occupied State); Cyprus v. Turk., App. No. 8007/77, 13 Eur. Comm'n on H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 85, 149 (1978).
_24 Id. at 176.
225 Drozd & Janosek v. France, 240 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 36.
226 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 & 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comim'n on H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 136 (1975).
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the extent that they exercise authority over such persons.
Insofar as the State's acts or omissions affect such persons,
227
the responsibility of the State is engaged.

In Illich Sanchez Ramirez v. France22s the applicant was arrested in
Khartoum by Sudanese security forces and handed over to French police
officers who escorted him to France in a French military aircraft. The Commission was willing to accept that he was effectively under the authority,
and therefore the jurisdiction, of France on state agent's authority principles, notwithstanding that this authority was being exercised abroad. The
fact that the French authorities took the applicant into their custody on Sudanese soil with the consent of the Sudanese authorities is a reason why this
case can be distinguished from a case where what occurred was done without the knowledge or consent of the state from which the kidnapped person
was taken.
In the next case, Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Workers' party of
Kurdistan (PKK) brought a complaint with regard to circumstances of his
arrest. He complained that his right to liberty and security of the person
under Article 5 (1) of the ECHR had been violated. 2 29 He maintained that
"he had been abducted by the Turkish authorities operating overseas", and
"suggested that the Kenyan officials involved in his arrest had been bribed
by Turkish agents and had acted without the authority of the Kenyan Government. '230 The Court held that "[a]n arrest made by the authorities of one
state on the territory of another state, without the consent of the latter, affects the ( . .) individual right to security" of the person arrested 23I and

"therefore within the 'jurisdiction' of that State for the purposes of Article 1
of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its author232
ity outside its territory.1

Stocke v. Germany, Report of the E.Comm.H.R. October 12, 1989, annexed to
Stocke v. Germany, App. No. 11755/85 Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 March 1991 (Series A)
227

199, 24, para 166.

Ramirez v. France, App. No. 28780/95, Eur. Comm. H.R. (June 24, 1996) 86
Dec. & Rep. 155.

228

229
230
231
232

Ocalan, supra note 48.
Id. at paras. 74-75.
Id. at para 85.
Id. at para 91.
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iv) Effective Control over the Territory within 'Espace Juridique' of the
European Convention
Cyprus v. Turkey (1975)
The issue arose out of the Turkish military operations in northern
Cyprus in July and August 1974 and the continuing division of the territory
of Cyprus. Three inter-state complaints, lodged by Cyprus, were examined
by the Commission in the 1970s and 1980s 233 . The Turkish Government
argued the applications inadmissible ratione loci because they are related to
alleged violations outside of the territory of Turkey. The Commission unanimously rejected this argument:
[The term "within the jurisdiction"] is not
equivalent to or limited to the territory of the High Contracting Party concerned. It is clear from the language, in
particular of the French text, and the object of this Article,
and from the purpose of the Convention as a whole that the
High Contracting parties are bound to secure the said rights
and freedoms to all persons under their actual authority and
responsibility, whether that authority is exercised on its
own territory or abroad.2 3 4 ( ... ) If a different meaning was
attached to the term "jurisdiction", states would be immune
for acts committed by them on other states' territories or,
235
indeed, on the high seas.
23 6
Loizidou v. Turkey

The applicant, a Greek Cypriot, claimed that she owned property in
Northern Cyprus and that Turkish forces prevented her from returning to it.
During a march to assert the rights of Greek Cypriot refugees, members of
the Turkish Cypriot police force detained her. She complained that her arrest and detention violated Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the ECHR and that the
The first and second application numbers (nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75) were
joined by the Commission and led to the adoption on July 10, 1976 of a report
under former Art. 31 of the Convention. The third application (no. 8007/77) lodged
by the applicant Government was the subject of a further report adopted by the
Commission on October 4, 1983. Because the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe failed to take any real decision the examinations of the cases effectively stopped at this stage.
234 Cyprus, supra note 226, at 136.
233

235

Id. at 138.

236

Loizidou, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) supra note 162.
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denial of access to her property was a continuing violation of Article 8 of
the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
At the admissibility phase the Court inter alia was called to examine whether the matters complained of are capable of falling within the
"jurisdiction" of Turkey even though they occur outside her national territory. In this respect the Court recalled that although Article 1 sets limits on
the reach of the Convention, "jurisdiction" is not limited to the national
territory. For the support of this conclusion the Court cited its previous case
law 237 concerning the extraterritorial effects of the acts of State's agents
"whether performed within or outside of the national boundaries." 23 8 It further stated:
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention,
the responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise
when as a consequence of military action whether lawful
or unlawful - it exercises effective control of an area
outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in
such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a
239
subordinate local administration.
The Court in the merits stage further addressed the issue of the level
of control for the purposes of holding the state responsible for violations in
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ("TRNC"):
It is not necessary to determine whether, as the applicant and the Government of Cyprus have suggested, Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the policies and
actions of the authorities of the 'TRNC'. It is obvious from
the large number of troops engaged in active duties in
northern Cyprus (.

.) that her army exercises effective

overall control over that part of the island. Such control,
according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of
the case, entails her responsibility for the policies and actions of the 'TRNC' (... ) Those affected by such policies

237

Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 468-69; Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/

89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 201, paras. 69-70(Mar. 20, 1991); Vilvarajah v. United
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 34 para 103 (Oct. 30, 1991): Drozd, App. No.
12747/87, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 91.
238 Loizidou, supra note 162, at para 62.
239 Id.
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or actions therefore come within the 'jurisdiction' of Turkey for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. Her
obligation to secure to the applicant the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention therefore extends to the northern
240
part of Cyprus.
Cyprus v. Turkey (2001)241
This was the first case to have been referred to the Court with respect to the situation that has existed in Cyprus since the start of Turkey's
military operations in northern Cyprus in July 1974. The applicant Government requested the Court in their memorial to "decide and declare that the
respondent State is responsible for continuing violations and other violations" with reference to four broad categories of complaints: alleged violations of the rights of Greek-Cypriot missing persons and their relatives;
alleged violations of the home and property rights of displaced persons;
alleged violations of the rights of enslaved Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus; alleged violations of the rights of Turkish Cypriots and the Gypsy
242
community in northern Cyprus.
Turkey maintained that "the Court in its Loizidou judgments (preliminary objections and merits) had erroneously concluded that the 'TRNC'
was a subordinate local administration whose acts and omissions engaged
the responsibility of Turkey. ' 243 The Court rejected this argument reaffirming its position in Loizidou. It held:
[I]f Turkey had no legal title in international law to
northern Cyprus, Turkey did have legal responsibility for
that area in Convention terms, given that she exercised
overall military and economic control over the area. This
overall and, in addition, exclusive control of the occupied
area was confirmed by irrefutable evidence of Turkey's
power to dictate the course of events in the occupied area.
In the applicant Government's submission, a Contracting
State to the Convention could not, by way of delegation of
powers to a subordinate and unlawful administration, avoid
its responsibility for breaches of the Convention, indeed of
Loizidou v. Turkey [GC], App. No. 15318/89, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 56
(Dec. 18, 1996).
241 Cyprus v. Turkey [GC] (Merits) (no. 25781/94) 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 69
(May 10, 2001) available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
242 Id. at para. 18.
243 Id. at para. 69 (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
240
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international law in general. To hold otherwise would, in
the present context of northern Cyprus, give rise to a grave
lacuna in the system of human-rights protection and, in244
deed, render the Convention system there inoperative.

From this wording it is clear that the Court gave a crucial importance to the "special character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order (ordre public) for the protection of individual human
- 45
beings and its mission.' 2
The Case of Ilascu

One of the recent cases concerning extraterritorial responsibility is

46
the case of Ilascu and others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation.

The application was lodged with the Court by four Moldovan nationals on 5
April 1999. The alleged acts were committed by the authorities of the "Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria" (the "MRT"), a region of Moldova
which proclaimed its independence in 1991 but is not recognized by the
international community. The applicants submitted that their conviction by
a Transdniestrian court was contrary to the right for fair trial' 47 , and that
they had been deprived of their possessions in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.248 They contended breach of Article 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention. In addition, Mr Ilascu alleged a violation of Article 2 of the
Convention on account of the fact that he had been sentenced to death. The
applicants argued that the Moldovan authorities were responsible under the
Convention for the alleged violations, since they had not taken any appropriate steps to put an end to them. They further asserted that the Russian
Federation shared responsibility since the territory of Transdniestria was
under de facto Russian control because of the Russian troops and military
equipment stationed there and also the support given to the MRT by the
Russian Federation.
As to Moldova, the Court concludes that the applicants are within
the jutisdiction of Moldova for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention
but that its responsibility for the acts complained of, committed in the territory of the MRT, over which it exercises no effective authority, is to be

246

Id. at para. 71.
Id. at para. 78.
I/ascit, 2004-VII Eur.Ct.H.R.para. 331.

247

ECHR, supra note 2,at art. 6.

244
245

Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, entered into force May 18, 1954.
248
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assessed in the light of its positive obligations under the Convention. In the
case of Russia the Court found that:
(... ) the "MRT" set up in 1991-1992 with the support of
the Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and its
own administration, remains under the effective authority,
or at the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian federation, and in any event that it survives by virtue
of the military, economic, financial, and political support
249
given to it by the Russian Federation.
In conclusion, the applicants therefore come within
the 'jurisdiction" of the Russian Federation for the purposes
of Article 1 of the Convention and its responsibility is en2 50
gaged with regard to the acts complained of.
v) Effective Control over the Territory Outside of 'Espace Juridique' of
the European Convention
Issa and Others v. Turkey
In Issa v Turkey, 25 1 a ruling given before the Bankovic judgment,
the Court had accepted that the applicants' complaints were admissible. The
issue in this case was whether extraterritorial jurisdiction existed in relation
to allegations that Turkey had committed breaches of ECHR rights in connection with the deaths of Iraqi shepherds who had allegedly been killed by
252
Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq.
The argument of the Turkish Government on the jurisdiction issue2 53 based on the Court's conclusion in Bankovic was that the ECHR was
a treaty operating in an essentially regional context. Turkey asserted that the
mere presence of Turkish armed forces in Northern Iraq for a limited time
and for a limited purpose was not synonymous with Article 1 "jurisdiction.' '254 Turkey did not exercise effective control of any part of Iraq. In
255
any event no Turkish soldiers had been present in the relevant area.
The applicants, on the other hand, maintained that Turkey's ground
operations in Northern Iraq at the time (when they were deploying more

252

Ilascu, 2004-VII Eur.Ct.H.R.para. 331, para 392.
Id. at 394.
Issa, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R.
Id.

253

Id. at paras. 56-61.

254

Id.

255

Id.

249

250
251
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than 35,000 ground troops backed by tanks, helicopters and F-16 fighter
aircraft) were sufficient to constitute "effective overall control" (within the
meaning of the Loizidou judgment). 256 Given the degree of control enjoyed
by the Turkish armed forces of the area, they argued that the Turkish government had de facto authority over northern Iraq and its inhabitants, as
25 7
opposed to de jure sovereignty.
The Court considered however that the conditions for the applicants' relatives to be under the "jurisdiction" of Turkey were not satisfied. 258 It distinguished the situation in Issa from Loizidou based upon (1)
that Turkey did not exercise effective overall control of the entire area of
Northern Iraq and (2) the troops in Cyprus "were present over a very much
longer period and were stationed throughout the whole of the territory of
259
Northern Cyprus.
Surprisingly, when stating the governing principles, the Court
makes no mentioning of espacejuridique of the ECHR. More importantly,
the Court went one step further than it had done in Bankovic or Ilascu. It
started by reminding itself that the "concept of 'jurisdiction' for the purposes of Article 1 of the [ECHR] must be considered to reflect the term's
meaning in public international law. '260 Then, after setting out a familiar
restatement of principles of effective control over territory, the Court continued:
Moreover, a State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who
are in the territory of another state but who are found to be
under the former State's authority and control through its
agents operating - whether lawfully or unlawfully - in the
latter State ( . .) Accountability in such situations stems

from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State,
which it could not perpetrate on its own territory (... )261
Although this was not a decision of a Grand Chamber (but the seven-judge
court contained three members of the court which had decided the Bankov'ic
case- Judges Costa, Baka and Thomassen) Issa appears to be an unequivo256
257
258
259
260
261

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at para. 62.
at para 82.
at para. 75.

at para. 67.
at para. 71.
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cal statement of states responsibility in a military context, even where the
contracting states' agents are operating outside the espace juridique of the
Council of Europe.
B.

Jurisprudence of other InternationalHuman Rights Tribunals

1. United Nations Human Rights Committee
Cases involving human rights violations committed outside the territory of the state have been also considered by such fora as the UN Human
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission.
The relevant article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states in full:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na262
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status.
There are two possible interpretations of this article. First, the individuals must be (i) within the territory and (ii) 'within its jurisdiction'. Second interpretation of Article 2(1) is that the obligation covers (i) all
individual within the territory and also (ii) all individuals within its jurisdiction, even if they are not within its territory. 263 Although the first interpretation is more literal one, arguably this interpretation could lead to a result,
which is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the ICCPR or is manifestly absurd contrary to what is required under articles 31 and 32 of the
VCLT. 264 It was proposed by some distinguished commentators that the
phrase 'within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction' should be read as a
disjunctive conjunction as in the second interpretation when the word 'and'
is replaced by 'or' 265

ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 2(1).
263 McGoldrick, supra note 34, at 60-64.
264 McGoldrick, supra note 34, at 60-62: on VCLT articles 31 and 32 see supra the
discussion in IV(A)(1)
26'

265

Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permis-

sible Derogations, in

THE INTERNATIONAL

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,

BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT

72, 74 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).

ON
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The Human Rights Committee has followed the second interpretation in several early decisions on individual communications 266 and most
recently in its General Comment No. 3 1.267
In Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, the Committee held that Uruguay violated its obligations under the Covenant when its security forces abducted
and tortured a Uruguayan citizen then living in Argentina. The Committee
observed the following:
[A]lthough the arrest and initial detention and mistreatment of Lopez Burgos allegedly took place on foreign
territory, the Committee is not barred either by virtue of
article 1 of the Optional Protocol ('. . individuals subject to
its jurisdiction. . .') or by virtue of article 2(1) of the Covenant ('. . individuals within its territory and subject to its

jurisdiction. .') from considering these allegations, together with the claim of subsequent abduction into Uruguayan territory, inasmuch as these were acts perpetrated
by Uruguayan agents on foreign soil.
The reference in article 1 of the Optional protocol
to 'individuals subject to its jurisdiction' does not affect the
above conclusion because the reference in that article is not
to the place where the violation occurred, but rather to relationship between the individual and the State in relation
to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant,
wherever they occurred.
Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obligation
upon a State Party to respect and to ensure rights 'to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction', but does not imply that the State party concerned
cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under
the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territor, of
another State, whether with acquiescence of the Government of the State or in opposition to it. According to article
5(1) of the Covenant, nothing in the present Covenant may
be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person
Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm'n No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/
52/1979 (1981); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm'n No. 56/1979, Int'l
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N Human Rights Comm., Doc. CCPR/C/
13/D/56/1979 (1981); Montero v. Uruguay, Comm'n. No. 106/1981, U.N. H.R.
266

Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, at 136 (1983/1990).
267 Human Rights Committee, supra note 125.
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any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
that is provided for in the present Covenant.
In line with this, it would be unconscionable to so
interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant
as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations
268
it could not perpetuate on its own territory.

In an individual opinion, Tomuschat asserted that such an interpretation was too broad and could "lead to utterly absurd results", inconsistent
2 69
with the intention of drafters.
Nevertheless, in the General Comment No. 31 the Committee stated
that "a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party,
even if not situated within the territory of the State Party." Similarly, after
affirming that the "enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens
of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of
nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant
workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or
subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party," the Committee noted that
"It]his principle also applies to those within the power or effective control
of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such
as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an
international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation."2 7 0 Wilde also
finds general "non-nationality" policy considerations behind this Comment. 271 That is, given that the majority of individuals affected by territorial
state action are a state's own nationals whereas, majority of individuals affected by extraterritorial conduct are aliens, to conceive jurisdiction only
territorially would produce discrimination in protection as between nationals and aliens.
This opinion has been partially endorsed in Advisory Opinion on
Legal Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pales268

Lopez Burgos, Comm'n No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, paras

12.1-12.3, emphasis added.
Lopez Burgos, Comm'n No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979.
270 Human Rights Committee, supra note 125.
269

271

Wilde, supra note 42, at 790.
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tinian Territory by the InternationalCourt of Justice.272 The Court held that
the Covenant is applicable to extraterritorialstate conduct. "However, in

contrast to the Human Rights Committee's broad reference to conduct by
authorities "that affect[s] the enjoyment of rights," the Court employed the
more specific, and arguably circular, formulation "acts done . . in the exercise of its jurisdiction" without providing guidance on what constitutes such
acts.

273

The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee shows that it
consistently held the ICCPR applicable to extraterritorial state's conduct
when exercised within the 'power and effective control' of State Party.
2.

Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection

Within the Inter-American System human rights are protected
under the following two instruments: the American Convention on Human
Rights 27 4 ('American Convention') in relation to the state parties thereto,
and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 275 ('American Declaration') in relation to the other member states that have not yet
ratified or acceded to the Convention. Article 2 of the American Declaration
has no express jurisdictional scope. 276 It was "not intended to function as a
treaty and no consideration was given" as to its application to the members
of the Organization of American States (OAS). 277 The American Convention in Article 1(1) limits its jurisdictional scope in the following words:
The State Parties to the Convention undertake to respect the
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exer-

cise of those rights and freedoms without any discrimina272

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, supra note 52.
273 John Cerone, The Application of Regional Human Rights Law Beyond Regional
Frontiers: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and US Activities in
Iraq, ASIL INSIGHT, October 25, 2005 at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/lO/

insights051025.html (quoting Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 43.)
274 American Convention, supra note 2.
_75 O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the
Inter-American System, OEA!Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, at 17 (1992).
276 Id. at art. 2.
277 Christina M. Cema, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Human Rights Instru-

ments of the Inter-American System, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 141 (F. Coomans & T. Kamminga eds. 2004).
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tion for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, eco27 8
nomic status, birth, or any other social condition.
The Inter-American Commission in Saldano case2 79 interpreted the
term 'jurisdiction' in the sense of Article 1(1) as not limited to, or merely
coextensive with national territory. It noted that "[a] State party to the
American Convention may be responsible under certain circumstances for
the acts and omissions of its agent which produce effects or are undertaken
outside that State's own territory. '280 The Commission cited jurisprudence
of the European Commission as authority for expanding the concept of 'jurisdiction' beyond a state's national territory: "This understanding of jurisdiction- and therefore responsibility for compliance with international
obligations- as a notion linked to authority and effective control, and not
merely to territorial boundaries has been confirmed and elaborated by the
28 1
European Commission and Court.."
In Coard et al. v. the United States28 2, the Commission examined

allegations that the military action led by US armed forces in Grenada in
October of 1983 violated a series of norms of international human rights
and humanitarian law. The 17 Grenadian claimants filed a petition, claiming that US forces had detained them, that they have been held incommunicado and mistreated before being turned over to the Grenadian
authorities.28 3 "They contended that the United States corrupted the
Grenadian judicial system by influencing the selection of judicial personnel
prior to their trial, financing the judiciary during their trial, and turning over
American Convention, supra note 2, emphasis added.
Victor Saldano v. Argentina, Petition, IACHR Report No. 38/99 (March
11,1999) (this case involved a petition presented in June 1998 against Argentina,
by an Argentine national, who had been sentenced to death in the United States.
The petitioner contended that Argentina had an obligation to present an interstate
complaint under the American Convention against the United States. The InterAmerican Commission declared the complaint inadmissible and stated that Argentina had no such obligation).
280 Id. at para 17.
281 Id. at paras 18 and 19. The Commission cited Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23;
X v. the United Kingdom, unreported, App. No. 7547/76. E. Comm'n. H.R.; Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7597/76, E.
Comm'n. H.R. (May 2, 1978; and Mrs. W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9749/82,
Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) 121 (July 8, 1987).
282 Coard, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.106, doc.3rev. para 39.
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testimonial and documentary evidence to Grenadian authorities, thereby depriving them of their right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal previously established by law. '284 The petitioners alleged that their
arrest and detention violated, inter alia, Articles 1, 18 and 25 of the American Declaration. The United States did not challenge the extraterritorial application of the American Declaration; however, the Commission chose to
address this issue. 285 It found that the phrase 'subject to its jurisdiction'
"may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct with an extraterritorial
locus, where the person concerned is present in the territory of one state, but
subject to the control of another state - usually through the acts of the
latter's agents abroad. ' 286 The Commission further stated that "[i]n principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or presence
within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority
'2 7
and control.
This criteria of 'authority and control' has been further confirmed
in Alejandre v. Cuba.288 The case is of particular interest to us also because
it is perhaps closest to the facts in Bankovic but opposite in the result. The
facts alleged that a Cuban military aircraft shot down two unarmed civilian
airplanes belonging to the 'Brothers to the Rescue' anti-Castro organization, resulting in the death of the four persons on board. "The Commission
examined the evidence and [found] that the victims died as a consequence
of direct actions taken "by agents of the Cuban State in international airspace" 28 9 and thus adopted a "cause and effect" notion of jurisdiction. 290 As
in Bankovic, the element of control employed by the respondent states was
29 1
the use of military weapons against civilians:
The Commission finds conclusive evidence that agents of
the Cuban State, although outside their territory, placed the
civilian pilots of the 'Brothers to the Rescue' organization
under their authority. Consequently, the Commission is
competent ratione loci to apply the American Convention
Id. at para. 1.
Id. at para 37.
286 Id. at para. 37.
287 Id.
288 Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.106, Doc. 6 REV. (1999).
289 Id. at para. 25.
290 Cerna, supra note 277.
291 Id. at 158.
284
285
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extraterritorially to the Cuban State in connection with the
events that took place in international airspace on February
24, 1996292
Accordingly, authority and control in this case had to be found solely in the
relationship between the agents of Cuba and the victims in the circumstances at the time of the incident. It is argued that the "Commission would
have assumed jurisdiction over Cuba even if the events occurred over the
territory of another member state" as the "'decisive elements' was the exercise of control. '293 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the events took
place within the Inter-American area.
The last group of cases in which the Commission has exercised
extraterritorial jurisdiction involves the indefinite detention outside the territory of the respondent state, but within the territory of another OAS member state. These are cases of the U.S. detention of several hundred
individuals at its Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.294 The Commission again invoked the 'authority and control' argument in justifying its
exercise of jurisdiction. It stated that "no person, under the authority and
control of a state, regardless of his or her circumstances, is devoid of legal
295
protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable human rights.
Thus, to the question whether human rights treaties apply extraterritorially "the Inter-America Commission... has applied a somewhat lower
threshold, simply requiring control over the individuals whose rights have
been violated. '296 However, one should bear in mind that all the cases with
the element of extraterritoriality concerned violations occurred within the
regional sphere of the Inter-American system. What comes to the violations, which are outside of the region, such as alleged human rights violaId.
Cema, supra note 277, at 159.
294 Cases include two categories of individuals. The first category is the group of
'Marielito' Cubans who were transferred to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and were
indefinitely detained there. The Petition was filed in April 1987, at a time when
approximately 3, 000 Cubans were detained in the United States due to their irregular entry in the country. See Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra v. United States, CASE 9903,
INTER-AM. C.H.R. , Report No. 51/01,OEA/SER.L/V/II.III, DOC. 20 REV. (2001).
The second category is comprised of some 300 persons who have been transferred
to Guantanamo from Afghanistan and other parts, and are currently being held as
,unlawful combatants', in furtherance of President Bush's war on terrorism. See
Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Request for PrecautionaryMeasures Concerning the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, (March 12, 2002).
295 Request for Precautionary Measures, supra note 294.
296 Cerone, supra note 273.
292
293
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tion of U.S. troops, committed in the course of seizing the Falluja General
Hospital in November 2004, Professor Cerone asserts that the argument for
2 97
regionatity should be weighted against universal nature of human rights.
It is true that regional human rights norms are formulated within a regional
framework. Indeed, the preamble of the American Convention on Human
Rights reaffirms the "intention [of the signatory states] to consolidate in this
hemisphere . . a system of personal liberty and social justice. '298 But at the
same time human rights have essentially universal character and focus on
how states ought to behave with respect to any human being under their
control. "The Commission could find that this regionality goes to the willingness of states within the region to agree on standards they regard as
299
essential to human dignity.."
C.

The ECHR in Domestic Courts of Member States

Extraterritorial application of the ECHR has been also addressed on
the domestic level. The key case on the point is AI-Skeini and Others v.
Secretary of State for Defence, a judgment delivered on 14 December 2004

by the English High Court of Justice (Divisional Court).300 The claim was
brought by relatives of Iraqi citizens who had died in Iraq at a time and
within geographical areas where the United Kingdom was recognized as an
occupying power. The first five claimants' relatives were shot in separate
armed incidents involving British troops. The sixth claimant's son, Mr Baha
Mousa, died in a military prison in British custody. The claimants alleged
violations of Article 2 of the ECHR (right to life), and in the case of the
sixth applicant- of Article 3 (freedom from torture). The United Kingdom
incorporated virtually all of the Convention rights and protections by virtue
of the Human Rights Act of 1998.
After a thorough examination of the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights and particularly, Bankovic case, domestic jurisprudence and jurisprudence of other nations, the English court drew three main
conclusions. First, the "essential and primary nature" of Article 1 jurisdiction is territorial. 30 1 Second, there are exceptions to this territorial limitation
and "[t]he area of dispute is as to the appropriate formulation of the exception[s].."'0 One of such exceptions is "when a state party has effective con-

301

Id.
Id.
Id.
Al-Skeini, [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), [2005] 2 W.L.R. 1401.
Id. at para. 245.

302

Id. at para. 246.
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trol of an area, lawful; or unlawful:" Loizidou, Cyprus, llascu.30 3 However
the doctrine of an effective control does not apply to the territories outside
the regional sphere of the party states of the Convention. 04 And finally, the
separate exception relating to the exercise of authority by state agents
30 5
outside their home jurisdiction as it can be found in cases like Ocalan,
Ramirez, 306 Lopez Burgos,30 7 Coard08 is not a broad doctrine of personal
jurisdiction but a limited exception to a primary doctrine of territorial
30 9
jurisdiction.
The English Court itself stated the principles governing application
of the ECHR to extraterritorial human rights violations in the following
words:
[T]he article 1 jurisdiction does not extend to a broad,
world-wide extraterritorial personal jurisdiction arising
from the exercise of authority by party states' agents anywhere in the world, but only to an extraterritorial jurisdiction which is exceptional and limited and to be found in
specific cases recognized in international law. Such instances (... ) are ones where, albeit the alleged violation of
Convention standards takes place outside the home territory
of the respondent state, it occurs by reason of the exercise
of state authority in or from a location which has a form of
discrete quasi-territorial quality, or where the state agent's
presence in a foreign state is consented to by that state and
protected by international law: such as diplomatic and consular premises, or vessels or aircraft registered in the respondent state.31 0
It follows from these conclusions that, since Iraq is not within the
regional sphere of the Convention the complaints do not fall within the
heading of the extraterritorial doctrine of the "effective control of an area"
exception. The English Court further examined whether the deaths can
come within the other recognized exception as resulting from the extraterri303
304
305

306
307
308
309
310

Id. at para. 248.
Id. at para. 249.
Ocalan, supra note 230.
Ramirez, supra note 228.
Lopez Burgos, supra note 266.
Coard,supra note 124.
Al-Skeini, supra note 300, at para. 274.
Id. at paras. 269-270.
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torial activity of state agents. It found that the first five claims do not fall
within that exception.
The sixth case of Mr Baha Mousa, however, is different:
He was not just a victim, under however unfortunate circumstances, of military operations. He was not, as we understand the matter, a prisoner of war. He was, prima facie
at any rate, a civilian employee. ( . .) He was taken into

custody in a British military base. There he met his death, it
is alleged by beatings at the hands of his prison guards.
(.

.) In the circumstances the burden lies on the British

military prison authorities to explain how he came to lose
his life while in British custody. It seems to us that it is not
at all straining the examples of extraterritorial jurisdiction
discussed in the jurisprudence concerned above to hold that
a British military prison, operating in Iraq with the consent
of the Iraqi sovereign authorities, and containing arrested
suspects falls within even a narrowly limited exception exemplified by embassies, consulates, vessels and aircraft,
311
and in the case of Hess v. United Kingdom, a prison.
Thus, the court found that the United Kingdom answerable for only
the complaint of Baha Mousa. It should be also noted that since the High
Court has largely relied on the Bankovic case, which it called a "watershed
authority" it needed to address the compatibility of Bankovic to the previous
and subsequent jurisprudence of the European Court and particularly to the
Issa case. To this the English court concluded that the Strasbourg jurispru312
dence as whole has to be re-evaluated in the light of Bankovic.
The judgment in Al-Skeini case has been further confirmed on the
appeal brought by the families of five Iraqi civilians and cross-appeal by the
Secretary of State in a case of Baha Mousa before Court of Appeal (Civil
Division). 313 The appellate court has dismissed the appeal with Lord Justice
Sedley expressing doubts about the result and unanimously dismissed the
cross-appeal. Here the Court of Appeal even further elaborated on the issues
related to extraterritorial state conduct and responsibility under human
rights treaties. On the issue when the ECHR has extraterritorial effect it
started with laying out what it considers being a common ground. 314- "It was
311

312
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Id. at paras. 286-287.
Id. at para. 268.
The Queen (on the application of Al Skeini and Others) v.The Secretary Of

State For Defence, [2005] EWCA CiN 1609, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508.
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a common ground that jurisdiction is essentially territorial."3'15 However,
"(i) if a contracting state has effective control of part of the territory of
another contracting state, it has jurisdiction within that territory (. .) (ii)
and if an agent of a contracting state exercises authority through the activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad or on board craft and vessels
registered in or flying the flag of the state, that state is similarly obliged to
secure those rights and freedoms to persons affected by that exercise of
authority. 3 16 The first category was described as "effective control of an
area" ("ECA") and the second the "state agent authority" ("SAA"). 17 Although the Court of Appeal supported decision of the Division Court it was
more cautious to Bankovic.31 8 It reasoned that:

...it left open both the ECA and SAA approaches to extraterritorial jurisdiction, while at the same time emphasizing
(in para 60) that because a SAA approach might constitute
a violation of another state's sovereignty (for example,
when someone is kidnapped by the agents of a state on the
territory of another state without that state's invitation or
consent), this route to any recognition that extra-territorial
jurisdiction has been exercised within the meaning of an
international treaty should be approached with caution.3 19
The court's overall conclusions are that a complainant will have no
standing under the ECHR unless the state establishes effective control of
the area with the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the host state or in
3 20
circumstances that amount to a military occupation.
It held that the Human Rights Act "has extraterritorial effect in
those cases where a public authority is found to have exercised extraterrito' 321
rial jurisdiction on the application of SAA principles.
For the purposes of our inquiry it is also important to examine the
"doubts" expressed by Lord Sedley.3 22 He went into detailed discussion of
what actually constitutes "effective control." Sedley argues,
315
316
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Id.
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Id. at para. 111.
Id. at para. 147.

322
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clusion would probably not be compatible with the central reasoning of Bankovic."

144

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 13
[t]he decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights do not speak with a single voice on the question
whether such a level of presence and activity engages the
responsibility of a member state on foreign soil. Issa v Turkey contains a clear indication that even a brief incursion
into a non-member state by a member state's troops will
bring with it liability for any violation of local people's
human rights which they can be proved to have committed.
Effective control here is equated with immediate presence
and power. Bankovic v Belgium, by contrast, rejects state
liability where Convention rights are violated by aerial
bombardment of a non-member state. Effective control here
323
is distinguished from immediate presence and power.
(. .. ) No doubt it is absurd to expect occupying

forces in the near-chaos of Iraq to enforce the right to
marry vouchsafed by [A]rt. 12 or the equality guarantees
vouchsafed by Art. 14. But I do not think effective control
involves this. If effective control in the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR marches with international humanitarian law and
the law of armed conflict, as it clearly seeks to do, it involves two key things: the de facto assumption of civil
power by an occupying state and a concomitant obligation
to do all that is possible to keep order and protect essential
civil rights. It does not make the occupying power the guarantor of rights; nor therefore does it demand sufficient control for all such purposes. What it does is place an
324
obligation on the occupier to do all it can.
.. If this is right, it is not an answer to say that the
UK, because it is unable to guarantee everything, is required to guarantee nothing. The question is whether our
armed forces' effectiveness on the streets in 2003-4 was so
exiguous that despite their assumption of power as an occupying force they lacked any real control of what happened
from hour to hour in the Basra region. My own answer
would be that the one thing British troops did have control
over, even in the labile situation described in the evidence,
was their own use of lethal force. Whether they were justified in using it in the situations they encountered, of which
at least four of the cases before us are examples, is pre323
324

Al-Skeini, [2005] EWCA Civ 1609, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508. at para. 192.
Id. at para. 196.
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cisely the subject of the inquiry which the appellants seek.
It is in such an inquiry that the low ratio of troops to civilians, the widespread availability of weapons and the prevalence of insurgency would fall to be evaluated. But, for
reasons I now come to, I am not confident that this route is
3 25
open in the present state of ECHR jurisprudence.
Thus, effective control is defined through "de facto assumption of
civil power" by an occupying state and corresponding obligation to do "all
it can" to keep order and protect essential civil rights.
Lord Sedley's overall conclusion is that at least where the right to
life is involved, the responsibility of the United Kingdom extends beyond
the walls of the British military prison and include the streets patrolled by
British troops.

V.

CONCLUSION

It seems that human rights bodies have accepted the possibility of
extraterritorial state responsibility. While the UN Committee is ready to
apply the ICCPR outside of state's territory given that there is a required
level of authority or control attributed to that state, regional bodies put geographical limitations. The European Court in Loizidou, and in its affirmation in Cyprus cases, laid the doctrine that effective control engages
responsibility to uphold the Convention's protections. Bankovic arguably
limited this assertion to espace juridique of the Convention. To date in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights there was no case concerning extraterritorial conduct outside of the regional system.3 26 In any event, the strong
argument against such application would be that the Preamble of the American Convention explicitly refers to the "intention [of the signatory states] to
consolidate in this hemisphere . . . a system of personal liberty and social
justice." According to Cerna, the regional human rights bodies must draw
the lines that circumscribe the limits on the exercise of there jurisdiction
somewhere. "Perhaps the line should be drawn to coincide with the exercise
of authority and control anywhere in the world, or perhaps it should be
drawn geographically to limit their jurisdiction to the territorial circumference of the region. A regional system, like the European system or the Inter-American system, unlike the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
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Id. at para. 197.
Cerna, supra note 277, at 170.

146

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 13

which is part of a universal system, is first and foremost defined by
327
geography.
While the extraterritorial applicability of human rights instruments
need to
is not disputed, the exact circumstances and the scope of obligations
328
be clarified. They can be robustly summarized as follows.
First, states can be held responsible for extraterritorial violations
when state agent is present in a foreign state by consent of that state and
protected by international law: such as diplomatic and consular premises, or
vessels or aircraft registered in the respondent state. Arguably in this situation states are obliged to ensure all range of rights both negative and positive, subject to the considerations that "'no impossible burden" shall be
imposed on the state. In addition, certain rights by their nature are not applicable extraterritorially.
Second, an extraterritorial military prison falls within limited exception exemplified by embassies, consulates, vessels and aircraft, and in
the case of Hess, a prison. "[S]uch an establishment is analogous to a diplomatic legation: not an extension of British territory, but a United Kingdom
enclave within another state, and so within the espacejuridique of the Convention. 3 29 This situation is not mentioned in the list of exceptional circumstances noted in Bankovic in para. 73, but according to the decision of
the English Court in Al-Skeini, can be deduced from jurisprudence under
the ECHR.
What comes to the scope of protection in the situation of extraterritorial prison, it should commensurate with the level of control, but in no
330
case fall below the minimum standards of non-derogable rights.
Third, occupied territories over which authority has been clearly
established can come within the full scope of human rights obligations of a
state. Examples include Northern Cyprus and the occupied Palestinian territories. The relevant test here is one of the power or "effective control" over
the area concerned. However, the status of occupied territories in which
significant hostilities have been occurring, as in the case of Iraq, remains
controversial. In addition, in the context of European system given the contradiction between Bankovic and Issa it is not clear whether the area conChristina M. Cerna, Current issues in Extraterritoriality: How Long is the
Long Ar7n Jurisdictionof InternationalHuman Rights Bodies? 11 ILSA J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 465, 469.
327

See Annex I: Circumstances of extraterritorial applicability of human rights
treaties.
329 Al-Skeini (Civ), [2005] EWCA Civ 1609, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508., at para. 184
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cerned can be outside of territory of the ECHR's member-states, whereas in
the Inter-American system such extra-regional state responsibility has not
been challenged. The crucial factor is also the precise meaning of "effective
control." Lord Sedley suggests that "effective control" assumes "de facto
assumption of civil powers." But this inevitably puts the threshold too high
and automatically excludes cases when there is a mere presence of ground
troops or air powers without taking certain governmental functions.
Finally, state's responsibility is also engaged when it exercises
power and authority over persons by abducting or detaining them on foreign
territory. But, the case might be different if there is an arbitrary killing
without prior arrest. The European Court in Bankovic considers that victims
have never been in the 'jurisdiction' of the states concerned and thus categorically repudiates a "cause and effect" theory of jurisdiction. In contrast,
the Inter-American Commission found jurisdiction in Alejandre v. Cuba. Of
course, one could argue that in the case at stake, as opposed to Bankovic,
any conflict of jurisdiction is eliminated since the events occurred in international airspace. Yet, the Commission suggests that the decisive element is
that the deaths were caused by the actions of Cuba military aircraft, which
exercised "authority and control" over the victims. The UN Human Rights
Committee has not been confronted with such complaints, but in the view
of this jurisprudence and General Comment No. 31 is more likely to follow
the approach of the Inter-American Commission.
When confronted with how different human rights tribunals 'open
the door' to extraterritorial state responsibility in one case and "close" it in
another almost similar case based on a number of semi-convincing and
often mutually exclusive arguments, one would also inquire into rationale
behind this jurisprudence.
R. Wilde summarizes the following general policy issues highlighted by human rights tribunals:
[H]uman rights law should apply to extraterritorial state action in order to prevent the following outcomes from occurring in the consequence of the extraterritorial nature of the
action: (1) a double standard of legality operating as between the territorial and extraterritorial locus (Lopez Burgos and Celiberti); (2) a disparity in human rights
protection operating on grounds of nationality (Coard and
General Comment 31); (3) a vacuum in rights protection
being created thorough the act of preventing the existing
331
sovereign from safeguarding rights (Cyprus v. Turkey).
131

Wilde, supra note 42, at 796-97.
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However, Wilde further argues that "these three outcomes (... ) should not

subsist merely because of the extraterritorial" location. 32 An alternative approach (adopted in Hess) would be to "approach the issue not in terms of
identifying reasons why human rights law should apply extraterritorially,
but, rather, by considering whether there are any persuasive reasons against
333
this position.
Yet, the problem with these or any other policy considerations lies
on a more abstract level. Do they make sense at all in the light of universal
nature of human rights? Are human rights to restrain governments or protect one defined group? Must human rights law be able to accommodate, for
instance, the need of state to effectively protect itself in the war against
terrorism?
The idea of human rights suggests that the reason for creation of
human rights instruments was a genuine concern for the well being of
human beings at large. There are, indeed, certain things that "ought to be
done" for each and every human being and there are certain things that
"ought not to be done" to any human being.3 34 To adopt a different position
would be inconsistent with a mission of human rights bodies to ensure observance of the rights enshrined in their respective treaties.
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CIRCUMSTANCES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

Authority over persons (personalized object)
Extraterritorial
activities of
consulates/
embassies
UN Human
Rights Cornmittee

Customary
norm of international law,
General Cornment # 31

Inter-American
ustomary
System of
norm of interHuman Rights liational law
5
protection
¢5

European Systern of Human
Rights Protection

Extraterritorial
prison

Extraterritorial
arrest or
abduction

General Conment # 31

Lopez Burgo,,
Celiberti

Guantanamo
detainees

Falls within
Hess v. UK,
recognized
Case of Baha
exceptions in
Mousa
Bcuikovic par.
73
X. v. Germari,
.. v, UK;

Effective control over foreign
territory (spatial object)

Extraterritorial
killing not
preceded by
Within the
Outside of the
arrest
regional sphere regional sphere
No case, but
likely to follow InterAmerican
Commission.
Also Cener-1

Wall Case, General Comment #
31

Coard

Alejandre v.
Cuba

US intervention in Grenada and
3 36
Panama

No case.
Likely to be
precluded by
preamble of
the American
Convention

Ocalan

Bankovic

Cyprus cases,
Loizidou

Not clear
Bankovc v
Issa

a,

- State's responsibility encompasses the whole range of substantive rights both positive and negative. This is, however,
subject to considerations that no impossible or disproportionate burden' should be imposed. In addition, some rights,
by their nature, may not apply extratemitorially In the case of extraterritorial prison scope of protection shall not fall
below the minimum standards of non-derogable rights
State's obligation is only to refrain from certain activities-negative obligations
- No responsibility or existence of responsibility is not clear

Note that that the Inter-American Commission has never held that a state party
is accountable for extraterritorial breaches outside the regional area, whereas to
date there appears to be no case on extraterritorial application decided by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
336 Arguably, these cases were considered to be within the jurisdiction not because
the respective territories were under the effective control of the United States but
because of state agents' authority and control.
335

